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1 Introduction
Discrimination matters because of fairness and efficiency concerns.1 Identifying
and tackling it is, however, a difficult task, and discrimination persists in
many countries and various spheres of life.2 Discrimination is often related to
social identities, i.e., people are treated differently based on which social group
they belong to. This paper considers the question whether decision makers
discriminate between candidates belonging to their own group and candidates
belonging to another group in hiring decisions under uncertainty. On the one
hand, we are interested in whether they do so when making decisions alone. On
the other hand, we would like to find out whether people discriminate in joint
decisions, i.e., in situations where they have an incentive to coordinate their
decision with a co-decision maker. We also want to learn more about whether
the group identity of the co-decision maker may matter in joint decisions.
We conducted a controlled laboratory experiment to investigate the basic
questions presented above concerning the relationship between discrimination
and social identity. In this experiment, decision makers had to make project
assignment decisions about whether to assign a project to a candidate or not
in a situation in which the outcome of the project was uncertain.3 There were
two types of sessions - control sessions and identity sessions. In identity sessions
participants were randomly divided into two groups, and each of these groups
separately underwent a group identity building stage before proceeding to the
hiring decisions. That is, in identity sessions we created groups and induced
group identities in the lab. In control sessions participants proceeded directly to
the hiring decisions. Each decision maker in each session made some individual as
well as some joint decisions. In joint decisions they had an incentive to coordinate
their decisions with a co-decision maker. We systematically varied co-decision
maker identity.
A key novel aspect and motivation for this study is that we are able to
compare the choices that people make when deciding alone with those they
make when having to coordinate with a co-decision maker in otherwise identical
situations, something that is not feasible in an uncontrolled environment. This
helps to enhance our understanding of the sources of discrimination. A further
1See e.g. Loury (2002) and Bramoulle` and Goyal (2012).
2See e.g. Anwar et al. (2012), Knowles et al. (2001), Gallo et al. (2013).
3Throughout the paper we use the term hiring decisions as synonymous to project
assignment decisions for simplicity of exposition.
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motivating factor is the observation that the real world abounds with cases in
which two or more people make a joint decision about a third party. Examples
include hiring, promotions, examinations, allocation of public contracts, juries,
as well as many more informal decision situations. Our study constitutes a step
towards understanding the role identity may play in joint decisions. If co-decision
maker identity matters even in a controlled setting, it may also create biases in
more complex environments in which such biases may be difficult to uncover due
to the multiplicity of additional factors involved.
We now summarize the main findings. We find substantial discrimination in
both individual and joint decision-making situations. Our analysis shows that
the presence/absence of discrimination, as well as the type of discriminatory
behavior observed, depends on whether a person is deciding alone or trying to
coordinate with someone else. It may also depend on the exact characteristics of
the situation considered. In individual decisions there is more hiring of own than
of other group candidates in a situation in which the expected monetary payoff
from hiring a candidate is lower than the monetary payoff from not hiring the
candidate, but not in the reverse case. In joint decisions, there is discrimination
when the two decision makers are of the same group. There is no discrimination
when deciding with a co-decision maker of the other group. By comparing
behavior in identity with behavior in control sessions, we can disentangle whether
the differential treatment of own and other group candidates is due to positive
treatment of the own group, or to negative treatment of the other group, or to
both. We find that in individual decisions the discriminatory behavior observed is
driven by negative treatment of the other group. Interestingly, in joint decisions,
even when deciding with someone from the own group, participants do not
negatively discriminate against other group candidates, but they do strongly
favor own group candidates.
There are two main messages from this study. First, the empirical findings
indicate that since the type of and motives for discrimination observed in joint
decisions may differ from the type of discrimination observed in individual
decisions, different policies may be needed to tackle them. Second, the finding
that co-decision maker identity plays a role even in a controlled environment
contributes to the debate on whether the composition of decision making bodies
in terms of the social identities of their members may matter for decisions.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In section 2 we discuss some
related literature. Section 3 provides details of the experimental design and
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implementation. Section 4 details our hypotheses. In section 5 we present our
analysis of the experimental data. Section 6 is a discussion of the results, and
section 7 concludes.
2 Related Literature
This paper belongs to the literature on how social identity affects decisions.4
Experimental findings from social psychology show that even when people
are divided into two groups in the laboratory on the basis of something as
unimportant as aesthetic preferences, and even when they expect no future
interactions with one another, they discriminate between members of their own
and members of the other group: i.e. they may overvalue the characteristics
of in-group compared to those of out-group members; furthermore, when asked
to allocate tokens between a member of their own and of the other group, they
may give more to an in-group member than to an out-group member (Tajfel and
Turner, 1979).5 Social Identity Theory explains why this may happen (Tajfel
and Turner, 1979; Tajfel, 1982): People are categorized and self-categorize into
groups, they identify with their group, and they derive self-esteem from a high
status of the in-group. Favoring the in-group over the out-group thus brings
them higher utility.
A number of recent experiments in economics have investigated whether
group identity may affect decisions in various situations. Some of these studies
consider the effect of natural social identities, i.e., social group affiliations existing
outside the laboratory (Bernhard et al., 2006; Goette et al., 2006). Some other
studies induce group identity in the laboratory, either by dividing people into two
groups based on their aesthetic preferences as in social psychology experiments
(Chen and Li, 2009), or by randomly dividing people into two groups, assigning
a label to each group and using some method to strengthen group identity (Eckel
and Grossman, 2005; Charness et al., 2007; Chen and Chen, 2011). The methods
used to strengthen group identity include working with the group on an unrelated
common problem (either paid or unpaid) in a pre-decision making stage to create
a shared experience, introducing payoff interdependence for members of a group
4The role of social identity has been widely recognized and researched in various fields
such as sociology, anthropology, social psychology, philosophy, history, and more recently in
economics. The aim here is not to give an overview of the extensive literature, but just to
highlight the most relevant strands and how this study relates to them.
5For an overview of the literature in social psychology, see Brown (2000).
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for this common problem, introducing competition between the groups for the
solution of this common problem, and the presence of an audience from the
own (other) group during the decision making stage. The consensus appears
to be that just randomly dividing participants into two groups and labeling
them is insufficient to induce group identity effects. However, if additionally
to the labeling people undergo a shared experience, the sense of identification
created through this shared experience is often sufficient to generate differences in
subsequent behavior towards own and towards other group members (Chen and
Chen, 2011; Eckel and Grossman, 2005). In this study we induce identities in the
lab by randomly assigning people to groups and letting them work together on a
common problem. In doing so we abstract from the specificity of relations within
and between groups existing in society, as well as from the influence of tastes
and stereotypes existing in society about particular groups and their historical
relations. This method focuses on the basic question whether people discriminate
between members of their own group and members of another group and thus
complements studies based on social identities existing outside the lab.
Social identity experiments in economics have found that social identity may
affect behavior in various situations such as contributions in a public goods game
(Eckel and Grossman, 2005), coordination in the Battle of the Sexes (Charness
et al., 2007), cooperation in the Prisoner’s Dilemma (Charness et al., 2007), and
coordination on a Pareto superior outcome in the Minimum Effort Game (Chen
and Chen, 2011). Chen and Li (2009) use a number of different games to quantify
differences in altruism, reciprocity, and punishment towards in- and out-group
members. Klor and Shayo (2010) find that subjects vote for a tax policy that
benefits the social group they belong to if the personal monetary costs of doing
so are not too high. In Li et al. (2011) group identity affects the choice of trading
partners and the prices realized in an experimental oligopolistic market. Goette
et al.’s (2006) and Bernhard et al.’s (2006) studies using natural social groups
show that group identity may matter for punishment decisions. In our setting
decision makers make decisions about whether to assign a project to a candidate
or not.
This study is also related to the experimental literature on discrimination.
Discrimination in a labor market context has been investigated, for example, in a
field experiment by Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004), who find that employers’
callback rates differ depending on whether a candidate has a ”white” or an
”African American” sounding name although the applicants from the two groups
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are equally qualified. Fershtman and Gneezy (2001), Gneezy et al. (2012), and
List (2004) look into rationales behind discrimination and show that taste based
and statistical discrimination explanations can account for some discrimination
in various settings. As will become clear later, the situation considered in this
study explores a further motive for discrimination. There are also numerous
studies testing for discrimination in naturally occurring data, some considering
individual decisions and others, committee decisions.6 To sum up, this paper
adds to the literature by testing both for discrimination in individual project
assignment decisions and for discrimination in joint decisions controlling for the
productivity of the candidates. We also investigate the effect of co-decision maker
identity in a stylized joint decision-making situation, keeping all else equal.
3 Experimental Design
This experiment investigates behavior in project assignment decisions. We study
whether group identity plays a role in such decisions. One of the treatment
variables is therefore group identity, and we have two types of sessions - control
sessions without group identity, and treatment sessions with group identity. A
key objective of the experiment is to compare individual behavior in individual
and in joint decision making situations. In both types of sessions therefore the
decision makers made some individual as well as some joint decisions. Thus, the
type of decision is a second focus variable. In identity sessions, we also vary the
group identity of the co-decision maker.
We ran eight control and eight identity sessions. There were twelve subjects
in each session. Allocation to sessions was random. In each identity session
participants were randomly divided into two groups of six, and each group
underwent an identity building stage before proceeding to the hiring decisions.
In control sessions participants proceeded directly to the hiring decisions. At the
beginning of the hiring stage, subjects received instructions about this stage
and completed a questionnaire to make sure that they have understood the
6For individual decisions, see for example, Shayo and Zussman (2011) who analyze decisions
of Arab and Jewish judges in Israeli small courts claims and find that judges from both groups
exhibit an in-group bias. Studies on the effect of group identities in committee/ joint decision-
making situations include the following: Anwar et al. (2012) on racial composition of the jury
and decisions in criminal trials; Bagues and Esteve-Volart (2010) on gender and examination
committees in the Spanish judicial system; Price and Wolfers (2010) on own-race bias of NBA
refereeing crews and Antonovics and Knight (2009); Bunzel and Marcoul (2008); Knowles et al.
(2001) on racial bias in vehicle search decisions by police officers.
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instructions. They were told that for each situation in which they have to make
a decision, they would be randomly and anonymously matched with some other
participant(s). They would never learn who they were matched with. After
receiving all instructions subjects were assigned either the role of decision maker
or the role of project candidate, which they kept until the end of the session. In
each session, eight subjects had the role of decision makers and four had the role
of project candidates. The roles were assigned randomly and anonymously.
Each decision maker made some individual as well as some joint decisions.
Individual decisions meant she had full decision power. In joint decisions, two
decision makers decided anonymously and independently of each other whether
to hire a candidate or not. They had an incentive to coordinate, and if their
decisions were not coordinated, no hiring decision was implemented. Each project
candidate was asked for their beliefs about what the decision makers would do
in a given hiring situation. During the experiment subjects would never receive
any feedback about any decisions taken by them or by others.
The experiment was conducted in 2012 at Queen Mary University of London.
All 192 participants were undergraduate students at Queen Mary who were
randomly drawn from a database of students interested in participating in
experiments. The experimental instructions are included in Appendix D. Control
sessions lasted about an hour and identity sessions lasted about an hour and a
half. The average earnings across all sessions were £19.13, which included a £3
show up fee.
3.1 Control Sessions
Each decision maker in a control session made four project assignment decisions.
Two of them were individual decisions, and two of them were joint decisions (see
Table 1). In an individual decision making situation, the decision maker has a
budget of £3.42 and has to decide whether to assign a project to a candidate
or not. If she does not assign the project to the candidate, the decision maker
can keep the budget for herself. If she assigns the project to the candidate, the
decision maker has to pay the candidate £3.42 for her services. The decision
maker does not know in advance whether the project will be successful or not,
but knows that chances of success are pi in 100 (0 < pi < 100). If the project
is completed successfully, the decision maker will get £xi. If the project is
not completed successfully, the decision maker will get £yi. The two sets of
parameter values used were: p1 = 35 in 100, x1 = £9.70, y1 = £0.50 for one of
6
the individual questions, and p2 = 45 in 100, x2 = £6.20, y2 = £0.60 for the other
individual question. Under parameter set 1, the expected payoff from hiring a
candidate £3.72 is slightly higher than the payoff from not hiring a candidate
£3.42, whereas under parameter set 2, the opposite holds (£3.42 from not hiring
versus £3.12 from hiring). The difference in expected payoffs from hiring versus
not hiring the candidate in the two cases is the same in absolute terms.
The two joint decisions that a decision maker faced involved the same two
sets of parameter values as the individual decisions. The difference is that the
decision makers are now told that there are two of them, and each of them has
to decide independently whether to assign the project to the candidate or not.
If both decision makers decide not to assign the project to the candidate, then
the project is not assigned, and each of them keeps the £3.42 for herself. If both
decision makers decide to assign the project to the candidate, then the project
is assigned, and each of them has to pay the candidate £3.42 for her services.
If the two decision makers make different decisions, then no project assignment
decision is implemented, and each decision maker incurs a disagreement cost of
£3, to be deducted from her budget. The parameter values were chosen with two
considerations in mind: first, so that under both sets of parameter values we could
expect that in the absence of group identity there would be some subjects who
choose to assign as well as some subjects who choose not to assign the project to
the candidates.7 Second, they were chosen so that under each parameter set there
exist two Nash equilibria in the joint decision making problem - corresponding
to the situations in which either both hire or both do not hire the candidate.
In all sessions the participants were told in the instructions that in order to
determine whether a project is successful or not a draw would be made from a
bag containing red and black chips at the end of the experiment. The number
of red and black chips in the bag corresponded to the chances that a project is
successful versus unsuccessful in a given decision situation.
We presented each candidate in a control session with the four questions a
decision maker faced, and we asked for each case what she thought the decision
maker would do. A candidate received £3 for each correct answer.
3.2 Identity Sessions
In identity sessions, group identity was induced in the lab in a stage preceding
the hiring decisions. Group assignment was random. Upon entering the room
7See e.g. Holt and Laury (2002) or Ambrus et al. (2009).
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Table 1: Set of Decisions for a Decision Maker in a Control/ Identity Session
Control Sessions Identity Sessions
Individual about PC set j about own PC set j
about PC set k about other PC set k
Joint about PC set j with own DM about own PC set j
with other DM about own PC set j
about PC set k with own DM about other PC set k
with other DM about other PC set k
Notes. DM: decision maker; PC: project candidate
j, k denote the parameter values related to probability of project success and payoffs
each subject drew an envelope, which contained either a blue or a green slip
of paper. If a person drew a blue slip, they were told that they will be in the
blue group and if they drew a green slip, they were told that they will be in the
green group. In each identity session there were six blue and six green group
members. After the general instructions, the members of a group were asked to
sit together around a table. Each group, then, received eight paintings, four of
them labeled “Artist 1”, and four of them labeled “Artist 2”.8 They were told
that they can discuss the paintings, and that afterwards they would be given four
more paintings without labels, and would have to identify for each of these four
paintings whether it was by Artist 1 or by Artist 2. Participants were allowed
to discuss their answers, but answers were individual, and a participant received
£2 for each correct answer.
After the identity induction stage, participants were asked to return to their
individual seats. They were given the instructions for the hiring stage and
the questionnaire which checked their understanding of the instructions, before
receiving their decision sheets. At that point, the participants were randomly
and anonymously assigned the roles of either decision maker or candidate so that
in each group there were four decision makers and two candidates.
Each decision maker in an identity session made six decisions in the hiring
stage. Note that the difference with the decision situations in the control sessions
is that the description of the decision situation included the group identity of
the decision maker(s) and the group identity of the candidate that the decision
8We used reproductions of paintings by Paul Klee and Wassily Kandinsky (see also Chen
and Chen, 2011; Chen and Li, 2009).
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was about. For example, you are a “blue” decision maker and you are randomly
matched to a “green” project candidate. One individual decision was about a
candidate of the own group under one set of parameter values, and the other
individual decision was about a candidate of the other group under the other set
of parameter values (see Table 1). Besides these two individual decisions, each
decision maker also made four joint decisions: one with a decision maker of the
own group about a candidate of the own group, one with a decision maker of
the own group about a candidate of the other group, one with a decision maker
of the other group about a candidate of the own group, and one with a decision
maker of the other group about a candidate of the other group. Note that for
each individual decision maker the set of parameter values used for questions
about own group candidates differed from the set used in questions about other
group candidates. Each project candidate in an identity session answered the
corresponding six questions about what she thought a decision maker would do
in each of the six situations described above.
3.3 Comparisons and Features
The comparisons we make are illustrated in Figure 1. In identity sessions we
compare behavior towards own with behavior towards other group candidates
both in individual (comparison 1) and in joint decisions (comparison 3). In
addition, in joint decisions in identity sessions we analyze how the choices depend
on the configurations of the identities of the decision makers and the candidate
(comparison 3). We also compare choices in identity sessions with choices in
control sessions, both for the individual and for the joint decisions (comparisons
2 and 4). And finally, we compare behavior in joint with behavior in individual
decisions both in control and in identity sessions (comparisons 5 and 6). Some of
these comparisons are within-subjects (5 and 6), some are between-subjects (1,
2, and 4), and 3 contains both some within-subjects and some between-subjects
comparisons. In particular the comparisons of behavior towards own and towards
other group candidates are between-subjects. By making a between-subjects
comparison of the behavior towards own and towards other group candidates,
the design of the experiment specifically avoids testing for blatant discrimination.
We would have been testing for blatant discrimination, if we had asked a decision
maker to make decisions about two absolutely identical members of the own and
of the other group in an absolutely identical situation (i.e. under the same
parameter values). This could potentially induce experimenter demand effects,
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as decision makers might notice that the candidates differ only in their group
identity. Therefore, as a precaution against the subjects becoming aware that
we are testing for discrimination, we vary not only the group identity of the
candidates that a decision maker faces, but also the parameter values attached
to them. That is, in our set-up a decision maker faces own group candidates
with one set of parameter values, and other group candidates with another set.
The design is balanced so that overall half of the decision makers face own group
candidates with parameter set 1 and other group candidates with parameter set
2, and the other half of the decision makers vice versa.
Additionally, note that a decision maker does not have to choose directly
between an own and an other group candidate, but is asked separate questions
about whether she would assign the project to a blue candidate with parameter
set j, and whether she would assign the project to a green candidate with
parameter set k. This is done to avoid pure focality effects. A pure focality
effect could arise in the joint decision-making case if we had two blue decision
makers and each of them had to choose whether to hire a blue or to hire a green
candidate. Then hiring a blue candidate could be a focal choice. In our set-up
the choice decision makers are presented with is to hire a given candidate or not.
A joint decision making situation thus amounts to a pure coordination game
with two Nash equilibria in pure strategies - both hire or both do not hire the
candidate. Ex-ante there are no obvious focality effects highlighting either of the
two equilibria.
Furthermore, we vary the matching of colors to sets of parameter values from
session to session. We also randomize the order of questions of each type for
each participant, and we allow participants to browse through the entire set of
questions on the decision sheets in order to avoid any order effects.
The joint hiring decisions constitute a coordination problem. Such a
coordination problem is a stylized representation of a wide range of social
interactions. Most directly, it captures situations in which decision makers have
to reach a common decision without having the opportunity to communicate
with one another. But its relevance is much broader than this. Whenever two
people have to undertake a common decision, even if communication is allowed,
there is most often a pre-communication stage in the decision making process,
in which each person considers for herself what to do and what she thinks the
other person will do. In many of these situations people will care not only about
the decision to be implemented but also about being coordinated, e.g. to avoid
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Control Identity 
Individual 2 1
decisions
5 6
Joint 4 3
decisions
Figure 1: Comparisons
spending time on discussions, as communication and time spent on discussions
involve opportunity costs. They would like to be coordinated already prior to
communicating. The joint decision making situation in our experiment is an
approximation of this pre-communication stage, and the miscoordination cost
that we introduce captures the costs of disagreeing. Note that even in cases when
decision makers will have an opportunity to communicate later or to engage in
repeated interaction, the choices they make in the first pre-communication stage
may have an effect on which outcome is realized later, because the initial choices
can influence their beliefs about each other.9
4 Hypotheses
Our hypotheses on behavior in individual decisions are derived, on the one hand,
from the findings of in-group bias in the social identity literature, and on the other
hand, from the taste for discrimination model. It has been established in social
identity experiments that people exhibit an ingroup-bias, i.e., they treat members
of the own group more favorably than members of the other group (Tajfel
and Turner, 1979). According to Becker (1971), an employer will discriminate
between members of two groups if she has a positive taste towards one group
and/or a negative taste towards the other group. We therefore hypothesize
that in individual decisions if an in-group bias or a taste for discrimination in
favor of the own group or against the other group exists, then members of the
own group will be hired more than members of the other group. By making
9This would be along the lines of Farrell (1987), who shows that cheap talk may influence
future interactions by creating focal points.
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comparisons of behavior towards candidates in identity sessions with behavior
towards candidates in control sessions, we can distinguish whether discrimination
is due to positive treatment of the own group, to negative treatment of the other
group or to both. We say that there is positive discrimination in favor of the own
group if members of the own group are hired more than candidates in control
sessions. There is negative discrimination against the other group if members of
the other group are hired less than candidates in control sessions.
Furthermore, we conjecture that the exact configurations of the group
identities of the parties involved may affect decisions in the joint decision making
case. This conjecture is based on findings from empirical studies using non-
experimental naturally occurring data that identify biases in decisions related
to the configurations of the social identity of the parties involved in a joint
decision making situation (e.g. Anwar et al., 2012; Bagues and Esteve-Volart,
2010; Price and Wolfers, 2010). To form the hypotheses that compare behavior
in two joint decision making cases, we add up the hypotheses for the behavior
of the two individuals involved. Therefore, some of the hypotheses comparing
behavior in two joint decision making situations will be one-directional and some
will be two-directional. An example of a one-directional alternative hypothesis
is the comparison of decisions with a co-decision maker of the own group about
a candidate of the own group and decisions with a co-decision maker of the
own group about a candidate of the other group. According to our hypothesis
on individual behavior, each of the two decision makers is expected to favor
candidates of the own group and to discriminate against candidates of the other
group. Therefore, we expect that the frequency with which individuals hire
own group candidates when deciding with an own group co-decision maker
will be higher than the frequency with which individuals hire other group
candidates when deciding with an own group co-decision maker. An example
of a two-directional alternative hypothesis is a comparison of the rates at which
individuals hire own and other group candidates when deciding with a co-decision
maker from the other group, i.e. when one decision maker may be expected to
favor and the other to discriminate against the candidate. The general null
hypothesis is that behavior in any pair of situations does not differ. Below we
list the four groups of alternative hypotheses that we test for in our analysis
of the experimental data. The numbered comparisons in brackets refer to our
design chart (Figure 1).
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Hypothesis 1: Discrimination in Individual Decisions
There is more hiring of own than of other group candidates in individual decisions
in identity sessions (comparison 1 in the design chart).
Hypothesis 2: Discrimination in Joint Decisions
Individuals hire more own than other group candidates in joint decisions in
identity sessions (comparison 3).
Hypothesis 3: Co-Decision Maker Identity and Discrimination in Joint
Decisions
a. Individuals hire more own than other group candidates when deciding with
an own group co-decision maker (comparison 3).
b. There is a difference in the rates at which individuals hire own and other group
candidates in joint decisions with an other group co-decision maker (comparison
3).
Hypothesis 4: Differences in Behavior in Joint versus Individual Decisions
a. There is a difference in behavior in joint versus individual decisions in control
sessions (comparison 5).
b. There is a difference in behavior in joint versus individual decisions in identity
sessions (comparison 6).
c. There is a difference in behavior in joint versus individual decisions in identity
sessions depending on the type of candidate and on the type of co-decision maker
(comparison 6).
To gain further understanding of the nature of potential discrimination and
to uncover whether differential treatment of own and other group candidates
is due to positive treatment of the own group or to negative treatment of the
other group, we also compare behavior towards own (other) group candidates in
identity sessions with behavior towards candidates in control sessions.
5 Analysis of the Experimental Data
In this section we report the statistical analysis of the experimental data, testing
the hypotheses presented in section 4. In order to control for potentially
unobserved factors that may affect behavior in a given session instead of
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treating each decision in a given session as an independent observation, we
treat the relative frequency of hiring in the situation of interest in one session
as one independent observation. Thus in each case we have eight independent
observations for control and eight independent observations for identity sessions.
The focus of the analysis is always on the relative frequencies with which
individual decision makers decide to assign a project to a candidate in different
decision situations. In the paper we call this interchangeably the ‘frequency
of hiring’ or ‘hiring rate’. Thus, for example, a relative frequency of hiring
of 0.59 in individual decisions in identity sessions means that in 59% of the
cases individual decision makers decided to assign the project to a candidate in
individual decisions in identity sessions. Likewise, a relative frequency of hiring
of 0.70 in joint decisions in identity sessions means that in 70% of the cases
individual decision makers decided to assign the project to a candidate in joint
decisions in identity sessions.10
We use standard non-parametric statistical tests for experimental analysis,
taking into account that subjects are randomly allocated to sessions and
treatments and that the design is balanced and based on randomization. Thus,
for the statistical significance of differences in any matched pairs and related
samples (i.e., all within-sessions) comparisons we use the Wilcoxon Signed Ranks
Test. For the statistical tests of all independent samples (i.e., between-sessions
comparisons) we use the Robust Rank Order Test. The significance level chosen
is α = 0.10.
The analysis and the levels of significance reported in the main part of
the paper are based on non-parametric statistical tests as they make fewer
distributional assumptions, as well as making the exposition simpler. As a
robustness check we also conduct detailed regression analysis which we report
in Appendix B. The regressions confirm the findings of the non-parametric
statistical tests. The statistical tests conducted on the basis of the estimated
regression coefficients have slightly higher power than the non-parametric
statistical tests and thus the non-parametric tests we report in the main text
most often give the more conservative estimate of significance. For example, in
many cases a difference that is significant at α = 0.10 using a non-parametric
test is significant at α = 0.05 using the tests based on the regressions.
10Note that in joint decisions the actual rate at which candidates are hired will be lower
as hiring requires coordinated hiring decisions. We also analyzed the differences in expected
coordination rates in the various joint decision making cases, but did not find any additional
insights. We thus focus throughout the paper on individual behavior, as our main goal is to
establish how individual behavior differs in alternative decision making situations.
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The four subsections in our analysis below correspond to the four sets of
hypotheses in section 4. In each subsection, the focus is on the decision makers’
behavior aggregated over the two sets of parameter values. To go in more depth,
we do, however, also test all our hypotheses on the decision makers’ behavior
separately for decisions under parameter set 1 and for decisions under parameter
set 2. Whenever the results are sensitive to the parameter set, we mention this
in the main text. At the end of each subsection, we formulate the main findings
as results of the analysis.
Table 2 in Appendix A presents an overview of all statistical tests for the
decision makers’ behavior aggregated over the two sets of parameters. Tables 3
and 4 in Appendix A show the corresponding results for the two sets of parameter
values separately. These tables include both the results of the non-parametric
statistical tests reported in the main text and the p-values from the tests based
on the regression coefficients.11
5.1 Discrimination in Individual Decisions
Figure 2 shows the data on individual hiring decisions aggregated over the two
sets of parameters. There is no difference in the hiring rates in individual
decisions in control and in identity sessions (both 0.5912). We are interested
in whether there is discrimination, i.e., differential treatment of own and of
other group candidates in individual decisions in identity sessions. Own group
candidates are hired at a rate of 0.61, which is slightly higher than the 0.58
hiring rate of other group candidates. As to positive discrimination in individual
decisions, the hiring rate of own group candidates in identity sessions is two
percentage points higher than the hiring of candidates in control sessions (0.61
versus 0.59). The hiring rate of other group candidates in identity sessions is
one percentage point lower than the hiring of candidates in control sessions
(0.58 versus 0.59). These differences are all in line with the hypotheses on
discrimination in individual decisions, but they are neither substantial nor
statistically significant.
Testing the same hypotheses on decision makers’ behavior separately under
each of the two parameter sets allows us to check whether the presence/absence
11The details of the regression estimation and of the tests based on the estimated regression
coefficients are in Appendix B.
12This is the average relative frequency of hiring in individual decisions in control/identity
sessions, averaged over the eight control/identity sessions, respectively. The other numbers we
report in the text have an analogical interpretation.
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Figure 2: Individual Decisions
of discrimination in individual decisions depends on the circumstances decision
makers face. The results are presented in Comparison 1 in Table 3 in Appendix
A for parameter set 1 and in Comparison 1 in Table 4 for parameter set 2. Under
parameter set 2, we observe substantially and significantly more hiring of own
than of other group candidates in individual decisions in identity sessions. The
hiring rate of own group candidates in individual decisions in identity sessions
under parameter set 2 is 0.69 versus a hiring rate of other group candidates of
0.47 (difference statistically significant at α = 0.10 level). This means that when
considering own group candidates, the hiring rate is 22 percentage points higher
than when considering other group candidates. The differences in decisions under
parameter set 1 are not statistically significant. Thus, the analysis indicates that
the occurrence of discrimination is sensitive to the exact characteristics of the
situation considered. We come back to this in the discussion section.
The comparisons of hiring rates of own (respectively other) group candidates
in individual decisions in identity sessions with the hiring rate in individual
decisions in control sessions (in both cases for parameter set 2) reveal that the
above discrimination is driven mainly by negative treatment of candidates from
the other group compared to the treatment of candidates in control sessions. The
hiring rate of other group candidates in identity sessions, 0.47, is 16 percentage
points lower than the hiring rate of candidates in control sessions, 0.63 (difference
statistically significant at α = 0.0513).
Result 1: We do not find substantial or significant evidence of discrimination in
13The significance level reported in this case is according to the tests based on the estimated
regression coefficients. We could not reject the hypothesis of no difference using the Robust
Rank Order Test. To check the robustness of the significance using the regression-based test,
we conducted an additional permutation test for significance, which shows significance at the
α = 0.10 level.
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individual decisions when considering the decisions aggregated over the two sets
of parameters. We do, however, find substantially and significantly less hiring
of other than of own group candidates in individual decisions under parameter
set 2. This discriminatory behavior under parameter set 2 is mainly driven by
negative discrimination against the other group.
5.2 Discrimination in Joint Decisions
The next question we are interested in is whether there is discrimination in joint
decisions. That is, do individuals hire more own than other group candidates
when trying to coordinate with another decision maker? And in case such
discrimination exists, we also want to know whether it is driven by negative
discrimination towards other group candidates, by positive discrimination
towards own group candidates, or by both.
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Figure 3: Joint Decisions
As Figure 3 shows, hiring of own group candidates in joint decisions in identity
sessions is 7 percentage points higher than hiring of other group candidates (0.73
versus 0.66). Although not statistically significant, this difference is consistent
with the discrimination hypothesis. Next, we examine whether this difference
is due to negative discrimination of other group candidates, or to positive
discrimination of own group candidates, or to both. As Figure 3 shows, the
hiring rate of other group candidates in joint decisions in identity sessions is
0.66, which is 4 percentage points higher than the hiring rate of candidates in
joint decisions in control sessions (0.62). This is not statistically significant and is
contrary to the hypothesis of negative discrimination of other group candidates.
We find a substantial and significant difference in hiring of own group
candidates in joint decisions in identity sessions compared to hiring of candidates
in joint decisions in control sessions (0.73 versus 0.62). This difference of 11
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percentage points is statistically significant (at α = 0.05), indicating strong
positive discrimination of own group candidates in joint decisions. That
is, although individuals do not negatively discriminate against other group
candidates in joint decisions, they discriminate by strongly favoring own group
candidates.
Disaggregating by parameter set, we find that under parameter set 1 there
is no substantial or significant difference in treatment of own and of other group
candidates in joint decisions in identity sessions. Under parameter set 2, the
hiring rate of own group candidates is substantially higher than the hiring rate
of other group candidates (0.84 versus 0.72, difference significant at α = 0.05
level). This differential treatment is entirely driven by positive discrimination in
favor of the own group. The hiring rate of own group candidates is 15 percentage
points higher than the hiring rate of candidates in control sessions (difference
statistically significant at α = 0.05). There is no evidence of negative treatment
of the other group.
Result 2: Aggregating over the two parameter sets, decision makers hire
more own than other group candidates in joint decisions. Although there is
no negative discrimination against other group candidates in joint decisions,
there is substantial and significant positive discrimination in favor of own group
candidates in joint decisions. Looking at the two parameter sets separately, we
find that the positive discrimination of the own group in joint decisions occurs
under parameter set 2.
5.3 Co-Decision Maker Identity and Discrimination in
Joint Decisions
In this subsection we analyze the effect of the identity of the co-decision maker
on the presence/absence of discrimination in joint decisions. That is, we ask the
following questions: Does a decision maker discriminate between own and other
group candidates when making a decision with a co-decision maker from the
own group? And does a decision maker treat own and other group candidates
differently when making a decision with someone from the other group?
Figure 4a focuses on decisions with own group co-decision maker. It shows
that when deciding with someone from their own group, individual decision
makers hire 12 percentage points more own group candidates than other group
candidates (0.78 versus 0.66), which is statistically significant at the α = 0.10
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Figure 4: Co-decision Maker Identity and Discrimination
level, indicating substantial discrimination when the two decision makers are
of the same group. Hiring of own group candidates when deciding with an
own group decision maker is 16 percentage points higher than hiring in joint
decisions in control sessions (0.78 versus 0.62), indicating again strong positive
discrimination in favor of the own group (statistically significant at α = 0.05
level). Interestingly, there is no negative discrimination towards other group
candidates when deciding with someone from the own group. In fact, when
deciding with an own group co-decision maker, hiring of other group candidates
is 4 percentage points higher than hiring of candidates in control sessions (0.66
versus 0.62), although this difference is not statistically significant. These results
are in line with the findings under each of the two parameter sets.
Result 3a: There is strong and significant discrimination when deciding with
someone from the own group. Although there is no negative discrimination
towards other group candidates, there is substantial and significant positive
discrimination in favor of own group candidates when deciding with someone
from the own group.
The next question is whether people discriminate when deciding with someone
from the other group. As Figure 4b shows, there is no difference in the relative
frequencies of hiring of own and other group candidates when deciding with an
other group decision maker (both at 0.67). Both hiring of own and of other
group candidates are a few percentage points higher when deciding with an
other group decision maker than in control sessions (0.67 versus 0.62), but this
difference is not statistically significant. Looking at each of the two parameter
sets separately, we find that there is a difference under each but that these
differences go in opposite directions and cancel each other out. In addition, they
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are not significant.
Result 3b: There is no significant evidence that people discriminate between own
and other group candidates when deciding with someone from the other group.
5.4 Differences in Behavior in Joint versus Individual
Decisions
From our analysis so far it becomes apparent that there are some differences in
how individuals behave when they make decisions alone compared to when they
have to coordinate their decision with a second person. Next, we examine in
more detail when such differences in behavior in joint versus individual decisions
occur. We do so for both control and identity sessions, in order to understand
whether these differences are simply driven by the fact that the decision is joint
rather than individual, or whether they have to do with the effects of the social
identities of the decision makers and the candidates.
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Figure 5: Joint versus Individual Decisions
Figure 5a shows the average hiring rates in individual and in joint decision
situations in control sessions. In control sessions the difference in hiring in joint
versus individual decisions is 3 percentage points (0.62 versus 0.59) and not
statistically significant. There is no difference in hiring rates in individual versus
joint decisions in control sessions under parameter set 1 and there is slightly more
hiring in joint than in individual decisions in control sessions under parameter
set 2 (the difference is statistically significant but the effect is not large). Thus,
the result that the difference in the hiring rate in joint versus individual decisions
in control sessions is small is supported under each of the two parameter sets.
Result 4a: In the absence of identity, there is little difference in individual
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hiring rates in joint compared to individual decisions.
Figure 5b shows the difference in joint versus individual decisions in sessions with
group identity. In identity sessions hiring in joint decisions is 11 percentage points
higher than hiring in individual decisions (0.70 versus 0.59). This difference in
hiring rates is substantial and statistically significant (at α = 0.10). Thus, under
the presence of group identity individual decision makers hire more candidates
when deciding with another person compared to when deciding alone. In identity
sessions, there is no difference in hiring rates in joint versus individual decisions
under parameter set 1 but there is a substantial and significant difference in
hiring rates (20 percentage points) in joint compared to individual decisions
under parameter set 2.
Result 4b: In the identity treatment decision makers hire substantially and
significantly more candidates in joint than in individual decisions. This difference
is entirely driven by more hiring in joint than in individual decisions under
parameter set 2.
Finally, to clarify further when differences in joint compared to individual
decisions arise, we decompose the decisions in identity sessions according to the
identities of the candidate and of the co-decision maker.
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Figure 6: Joint versus Individual Decisions by Candidate Type
As Figure 6a shows, individuals hire 17 percentage points more own group
candidates when deciding with an own group decision maker than when deciding
individually (0.78 versus 0.61, difference statistically significant at α = 0.10).
Individuals hire 6 percentage points more own group candidates when deciding
with other group decision maker than when deciding individually (0.67 versus
0.61, not statistically significant). Figure 6b shows that there are also increases in
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the hiring of other group candidates in joint decisions, both with own and with
other group decision makers, compared to individual decisions (8 percentage
points and 9 percentage points, respectively), although these increases are not
statistically significant.
Distinguishing by parameter set, individuals hire substantially more own
group candidates when deciding with own group decision maker than when
deciding individually under each of the two parameter sets. Under parameter
set 2, individuals also hire substantially and significantly more other group
candidates in joint than in individual decisions (both when deciding with own
and with other group co-decision maker).
Result 4c: In identity sessions decision makers hire on aggregate substantially
and significantly more own group candidates in joint than in individual decisions.
The difference is especially big when deciding with an own group decision maker.
There is also more hiring of other group candidates in joint than in individual
decisions, regardless of the identity of the co-decision maker. It is driven by
more hiring of other group candidates in joint than in individual decisions under
parameter set 2.
6 Discussion
In this section we discuss the main empirical results of the paper, linking them
to previous literature and to potential theoretical explanations. We begin
by highlighting our three main findings. First, the data show that there is
substantial and significant discrimination in individual decisions under parameter
set 2. The hiring rate of own group candidates in individual decisions in identity
sessions under parameter set 2 (0.69) is 22 percentage points higher than the
hiring rate of other group candidates (0.47). This seems to be due mainly to
negative discrimination against the other group.
Second, on aggregate we find also more hiring of own than of other group
candidates in joint decisions. In particular, there is substantial and significant
discrimination in joint decisions under parameter set 2. In this case, the difference
in hiring rates of own and other group candidates is 12 percentage points.
Discrimination in joint decisions takes the form of positive treatment of the
own group rather than of negative treatment of the other group. Thus, the
type of discrimination observed in joint decisions is different from the type of
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discrimination observed in individual decisions.
And third, a key finding in this study is that the configurations of the
identities of the decision makers and the candidate in joint decisions matter
a great deal. In particular, there is substantial discrimination in joint decisions
with an own group decision maker, occurring under each of the two parameter
sets. Overall, i.e. aggregating over the two parameter sets, in decisions with
an own group decision maker individuals hire 78% of own group candidates,
compared with only 66% of other group candidates. There is no substantive
evidence of discrimination occurring when decisions are made with other group
co-decision maker.
What is remarkable about these findings is that discrimination occurs in a
controlled set-up in which own and other group candidates are identical in all else
but their group identity. Moreover, when discrimination occurs the magnitude
of the discriminatory effect is rather large, i.e. in the range of 10-20 percentage
points difference in hiring of own and other group candidates. It should be
noted that this is without any conflict of interest between the two groups and
with identities induced through just working on a common problem. One could
imagine that if there were conflicts of interest or if the groups involved had a
long history of disagreement, the effect could be even stronger. This finding
of differential treatment of the own and the other group in project assignment
decisions lends empirical support to the idea that group identity may matter
(Tajfel and Turner, 1979; Akerlof and Kranton, 2000) and adds to previous
experimental studies on the role of social identity for the decisions that people
make in other contexts (Brown, 2000; Chen and Chen, 2011; Chen and Li, 2009;
Eckel and Grossman, 2005; Charness et al., 2007).
One question that arises in our experiment is why we find substantial and
significant discrimination under one parameter set but not under the other.
Although, as pointed out above, much of the experimental literature suggests
that there are differences in treatment of own and other group members in
many situations, there are also studies that do not find such effects in all cases,
suggesting that the role of identity can be subtle and can depend on the exact
situation considered (Ahmed, 2007; Gueth et al., 2008; Drouvelis and Nosenzo,
2013). What we observe in our experiment is that individuals hire significantly
more own than other group candidates in the case when the expected payoff from
hiring a candidate was slightly lower than the payoff from not hiring a candidate.
One possible interpretation of the occurrence of negative discrimination towards
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other group candidates under parameter set 2 is that decision makers are less
willing to take risk when other group candidates are involved than when own
group candidates are involved.14
Our finding of discrimination in joint decisions when the two decision makers
are of the same group adds to the findings of empirical studies based on non-
experimental data that find biases in decisions related to the group identities
of the members of a committee (Bagues and Esteve-Volart, 2010; Anwar et al.,
2012; Zinovyeva and Bagues, 2011; Price and Wolfers, 2010). These studies have
used observational data from contexts ranging from jury decisions in criminal
courts to the decisions of examination committees in the Spanish judicial system
to the decisions of a crew of basketball referees, to show that the configurations of
group identities of a committee’s members can lead to biases in decision making.
Our experiment complements them in several ways. We take one element of
committee decision making, the coordination motive, and conduct a study of
how decision makers interested in coordinating their decisions may be affected
by the identity of their co-decision maker. By necessity, in doing so we leave
out many important aspects of real world committee decision making - e.g.
communication, repeated interaction, power relations, etc. The benefit of doing
so is that we are able to study and isolate the effect of group identity in joint
decisions in a controlled setting. Additionally, by inducing group identities in the
lab we also abstract from the tastes and stereotypes that may exist in favor of or
against particular groups in society. By documenting the possibility that group
identity affects decisions even in a controlled environment, we hope to contribute
to the debate of whether the public could have reasons to be concerned about all
members of a decision making body being of the same group (e.g. all black/white,
all women/men). Our findings suggest that such concerns are not unwarranted
even in a controlled setting and that it is therefore important to investigate the
matter further in other environments.
We now discuss how our findings can be interpreted in terms of the theoretical
literature on discrimination. Given that the design is balanced so that own
and other group candidates have the same characteristics, the discrimination
occurring in individual decisions seems in line with in-group bias as discussed
by Social Identity Theory in psychology see Tajfel and Turner (1979). It is
14To the best of our knowledge the connection between willingness to take risk and in-group
bias has not been investigated in the literature so far. An exception is the recent experiment
by Currarini and Mengel (2013) which documents a correlation between risk aversion and
homophily. The findings from both papers suggest that it could be an interesting direction for
further research.
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also consistent with Gary Becker’s taste for discrimination model, in which an
employer has tastes in favor of or against particular groups. Our experimental
design allows us to distinguish whether the discrimination that manifests itself in
the behavior of decision makers is due to a negative treatment of the other group
or to a positive treatment in favor of the own group. We find that in individual
decisions negative discrimination against the other group is prevalent.15
Decision makers discriminate in both some individual and in some joint
decision making situations, but as highlighted above the type of discrimination
observed is different. This suggests that decision makers may have different
motives to discriminate in the two types of decision situations. In particular, in
joint decisions decision makers have an incentive to coordinate their decisions
with a co-decision maker. Thus, they have a strategic interest in considering
what their co-decision maker will do or what their co-decision maker believes
they will do and so on, including higher order beliefs.
The experimental findings are consistent with a situation in which decision
makers exhibit negative discrimination against other group candidates in
individual decisions but their expectations about behavior in the joint decision
making case are that the co-decision maker will not negatively discriminate
against the other group or that the co-decision maker does not expect them
to negatively discriminate, etc. One reason this could be the case is that
discrimination in the sense of treating members of the other group in a
negative way is frowned upon in society and thus against the social norm and
this is common knowledge among participants in the experiment. A related
interpretation of the finding of positive discrimination of the own group in joint
decisions is that it captures expectations of favoritism of the own group.
Note that distinguishing whether discrimination is due to positive treatment
of the own group or to negative treatment of the other group may be difficult in
non-controlled environments. Still, distinguishing between the two cases where
possible is informative for two reasons. First, in the real world accusations of
discrimination between members of the own and of the other group are often
countered with the argument that one treats candidates of the other group
15Note that the set-up here is different from the one considered in statistical discrimination
models, e.g. Arrow (1973); Coate and Loury (1993). In statistical discrimination models
there is an employer, who faces workers from two groups and does not have information about
the productivity characteristics of the individual worker, but has beliefs about the average
productivity characteristics in a group. In our case, there is no incompleteness of information
about productivity. Thus, different beliefs about the productivity of own and other group
project candidates cannot explain discrimination here.
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according to their ”objective” characteristics. As behavior in this experiment
shows, this may be indeed true in some situations (e.g. in joint decisions there
is no negative discrimination against other group candidates). However, positive
and negative discrimination may be two sides of the same coin, and the existence
of positive discrimination of the own group in joint decisions may be no less
harmful in terms of long-run efficiency and fairness consequences. Furthermore,
arguments have been made that while discrimination based on negative tastes is
expected to disappear in the long run, discrimination based on positive tastes is
expected to persist (Ahmed, 2007; Goldberg, 1982).16
Game-theoretically one can think of a particular configuration of group
identities in the joint decision making case as a common public signal perceived
by both decision makers. This public signal allows for the realization of correlated
equilibria. Although the public signal may act as a coordination device, the signal
is a priori uninformative as to which of these many equilibria to play.17
The public signal may, however, prompt beliefs in each decision maker
regarding the expected behavior under that configuration of group identities,
and it is these beliefs that constitute an essential difference with individual
decisions. Thus, for example, when two decision makers of the same group
try to coordinate on a decision regarding a candidate of their own group, they
consider not only what they individually would prefer to do, but also what they
expect the other to do, and what the other in turn expects them to do, and so
on. Decision makers may, then, choose between hiring and not hiring in such
situations depending on their beliefs about the strength of the social norm of
favoritism of the own group, or about negative discrimination against the other
group in the population. What our experimental analysis shows is that there are
strong mutual expectations about the existence of a social norm of favoritism of
the own group.
It should be highlighted here that although we are discussing the role of beliefs
as a potential mechanism through which discrimination is channelled in joint
decisions, this is again not in the sense of the statistical discrimination literature
where an employer has incomplete information about the characteristics of
the candidate and forms beliefs about them. Here the beliefs are about co-
decision maker’s behavior. Our story is thus reminiscent of Gary Becker’s co-
16For distinguishing positive/negative discrimination in other contexts, see also Ahmed
(2007) and Feld et al. (2013).
17Note that in each joint decision making situation in our experiment there are two pure
strategy Nash equilibria (either both hiring or both not hiring), and that the presence of group
identities as such does not make one of these equilibria more focal than the other.
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worker discrimination in which an employer may negatively discriminate against
a worker belonging to a group his other workers discriminate against even if
the employer does not have a taste for discrimination (Becker, 1971). Note
that in Becker the co-worker discrimination case is phrased as an individual
decision making situation in which it is one employer who makes a decision,
taking into account the tastes of workers. In our experiment, the joint decision
making situation is symmetric. Two people make independent decisions about
whether to assign a project to a candidate or not and have equal decision
power. Other relevant theoretical explanations include the Akerlof (1976) and
Peski and Szentes (2013) models, in which a person discriminates in spite of
not having discriminatory tastes because this individual fears punishment in
subsequent periods from other people in the community in case the social norm
of discriminating is not obeyed. In both of these cases discrimination can result
even in spite of an individual’s tastes. The main difference between the situations
considered in these models and the set-up in our experiment is that we consider
a joint rather than an individual decision making situation. In our case, we do
observe discrimination also in individual decisions, but the type of discrimination
observed in joint decisions differs from the type of discrimination observed in
individual decisions suggesting that beliefs about what the other person may
do play a role. The model by Ramachandran and Rauh (2014) is close to our
set-up in the sense that it considers a decision making situation in which two
principals have equal decision making power about an agent and they make
decisions independently of each other. The authors show that discriminatory
behavior can persist in this set-up even if the principals do not have a taste for
discrimination.
Our experiment complements the insights from these models and provides
first empirical evidence in a controlled environment that the beliefs about what
a co-decision maker will do influence the decisions an individual makes in a joint
decision making situation, in which people have to coordinate decisions. That
is, by comparing the behavior in individual and joint decisions, we document
that in the two types of decision situations, different motives seem to play a
role. Moreover, the identity of the co-decision maker in joint decisions affects
the presence/absence of discriminatory behavior.
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7 Concluding Remarks
This paper presented an experiment studying the role of social identity in
individual and joint project assignment decisions. Our empirical findings
document that substantial discrimination occurs in both types of decision
situations. Moreover, the type of discrimination observed in individual decisions
differs from the type of discrimination observed in joint decisions. Thus, the
experiment suggests that anti-discrimination policy may have to be context
sensitive, and that special attention should be paid to eradicating the acceptance
of positive discrimination as a social norm in joint decision making situations.
By documenting the effect of the identity of the co-decision maker on the
presence of discrimination in a controlled set-up this paper contributes to the
public discussion on more diversity in committees, e.g. questions such as
whether committees consisting of only men/only women or only white/only black
members may make biased decisions. This study is not a substitute for studies
on the role of group identity in committee decision making, but a complement
to them, highlighting that if co-decision maker identity may play a role even in a
controlled setting, with group identities induced in the lab, and without conflict
of interest, concerns about all members of a decision making body belonging to
the same group may not be unwarranted.
We believe that our findings underline the need for further studies to establish
to what extent the observations that individuals behave differently in individual
and in joint decision-making situations and that co-decision maker identity
matters extend to other environments. Two potential directions for further
research are the following. On the one hand, it would be interesting to conduct
further controlled studies on differences in individual and joint decisions using
social identities existing outside the lab such as gender, race, and religion. On
the other hand, it would be beneficial to have a better understanding of the role
of identities of committee members under alternative committee decision making
rules, e.g. under unanimity versus majority voting.
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Appendix A. Tables
Decision Makers’ Hiring Decisions
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Table 2: DM’s Hiring Decisions Aggregated over the Parameter Sets
Comparison 1 - Individual Decisions in Identity Sessions
situation hiring
rate
situation hiring
rate
Difference p-value
WSRT
p-value
regress.
tail
own PC 0.61 other PC 0.58 0.03 0.371 0.379 one
Comparison 2 - Individual Decisions in Identity vs Control Sessions
situation hiring
rate
situation hiring
rate
Difference RROT
U
p-value
regress.
tail
own PC Identity 0.61 Control 0.59 0.02 0.050 0.390 one
other PC Identity 0.58 Control 0.59 -0.01 0.094 0.469 one
Comparison 3 - Joint Decisions in Identity Sessions
situation hiring
rate
situation hiring
rate
Difference p-value
WSRT
p-value
regress.
tail
own PC 0.73 other PC 0.66 0.07 0.156 0.122 one
own DM own PC 0.78 other DM own PC 0.67 0.11*/** 0.055 0.030 one
own DM own PC 0.78 own DM other PC 0.66 0.12*/** 0.063 0.013 one
other DM own PC 0.67 other DM other PC 0.67 0.00 - 1.000 two
own DM other PC 0.66 other DM other PC 0.67 -0.01 0.453 0.412 one
Comparison 4 - Joint Decisions in Identity vs Control Sessions
situation hiring
rate
situation hiring
rate
Difference RROT
U
p-value
regress.
tail
own PC Identity 0.73 Control 0.62 0.11**/** 1.782 0.029 one
other PC Identity 0.66 Control 0.62 0.04 0.966 0.830 one
own DM own PC 0.78 Control 0.62 0.16**/*** 2.800 0.005 one
other DM own PC 0.67 Control 0.62 0.05 0.884 0.401 two
own DM other PC 0.66 Control 0.62 0.04 0.988 0.843 one
other DM other PC 0.67 Control 0.62 0.05 1.259 0.473 two
Comparison 5 - Joint vs Individual Decisions in Control Sessions
situation hiring
rate
situation hiring
rate
Difference p-value
WSRT
p-value
regress.
tail
Joint 0.62 Indiv. 0.59 0.03 0.844 0.646 two
Comparison 6 - Joint vs Individual Decisions in Identity Sessions
situation hiring
rate
situation hiring
rate
Difference p-value
WSRT
p-value
regress.
tail
Joint 0.70 Indiv. 0.59 0.11*/** 0.066 0.015 two
Joint own PC 0.73 Indiv. own PC 0.61 0.12*/** 0.094 0.041 two
Joint other PC 0.66 Indiv. other PC 0.58 0.08 0.313 0.227 two
own DM own PC 0.78 Indiv. own PC 0.61 0.17*/** 0.078 0.029 two
other DM own PC 0.67 Indiv. own PC 0.61 0.06 0.3125 0.189 two
own DM other PC 0.66 Indiv. other PC 0.58 0.08 0.438 0.395 two
other DM other PC 0.67 Indiv. other PC 0.58 0.09 0.219 0.157 two
Notes. WSRT: Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test; RROT: Robust Rank Order Test
p-value regress.: based on tests using the estimated regression coefficients
* significant at 10% level; ** at 5% level; *** at 1% level;
column 5: sign. based on column 6/column 7; one/two = one-/two-tailed tests
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Table 3: DM’s Hiring Decisions towards Candidates with Parameter Set 1
Comparison 1 - Individual Decisions in Identity Sessions
situation hiring
rate
situation hiring
rate
Difference p-value
WSRT
p-value
regress.
tail
own PC 0.53 other PC 0.69 -0.16 0.422 0.859 one
Comparison 2 - Individual Decisions in Identity vs Control Sessions
situation hiring
rate
situation hiring
rate
Difference RROT
U
p-value
regress.
tail
own PC Identity 0.53 Control 0.55 -0.02 -0.662 0.561 one
other PC Identity 0.69 Control 0.55 0.14 0.563 0.856 one
Comparison 3 - Joint Decisions in Identity Sessions
situation hiring
rate
situation hiring
rate
Difference p-value
WSRT
p-value
regress.
tail
own PC 0.61 other PC 0.61 0.00 - 0.500 one
own DM own PC 0.72 other DM own PC 0.50 0.22*/** 0.055 0.031 one
own DM own PC 0.72 own DM other PC 0.59 0.13 0.168 0.153 one
other DM own PC 0.50 other DM other PC 0.63 -0.13 0.375 0.226 two
own DM other PC 0.59 other DM other PC 0.63 -0.04 0.438 0.402 one
Comparison 4 - Joint Decisions in Identity vs Control Sessions
situation hiring
rate
situation hiring
rate
Difference RROT
U
p-value
regress.
tail
own PC Identity 0.61 Control 0.55 0.06 0.407 0.257 one
other PC Identity 0.61 Control 0.55 0.06 0.786 0.772 one
own DM own PC 0.72 Control 0.55 0.17*/* 1.348 0.067 one
other DM own PC 0.50 Control 0.55 -0.05 -0.727 0.672 two
own DM other PC 0.59 Control 0.55 0.04 -0.053 0.681 one
other DM other PC 0.63 Control 0.55 0.08 0.783 0.480 two
Comparison 5 - Joint vs Individual Decisions in Control Sessions
situation hiring
rate
situation hiring
rate
Difference p-value
WSRT
p-value
regress.
tail
Joint 0.55 Indiv. 0.55 0.00 - 1.000 two
Comparison 6 - Joint vs Individual Decisions in Identity Sessions
situation hiring
rate
situation hiring
rate
Difference p-value
WSRT
p-value
regress.
tail
Joint 0.61 Indiv. 0.61 0.00 - 1.000 two
Joint own PC 0.61 Indiv. own PC 0.53 0.08 0.297 0.380 two
Joint other PC 0.61 Indiv. other PC 0.69 -0.08 0.524 0.503 two
own DM own PC 0.72 Indiv. own PC 0.53 0.19 0.250 0.132 two
other DM own PC 0.50 Indiv. own PC 0.53 -0.03 0.875 0.725 two
own DM other PC 0.59 Indiv. other PC 0.69 -0.10 1.000 0.535 two
other DM other PC 0.63 Indiv. other PC 0.69 -0.06 0.688 0.587 two
Notes. WSRT: Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test; RROT: Robust Rank Order Test
p-value regress.: based on tests using the estimated regression coefficients
* significant at 10% level; ** at 5% level; *** at 1% level;
column 5: sign. based on column 6/column 7; one/two = one-/two-tailed tests
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Table 4: DM’s Hiring Decisions towards Candidates with Parameter Set 2
Comparison 1 - Individual Decisions in Identity Sessions
situation hiring
rate
situation hiring
rate
Difference p-value
WSRT
p-value
regress.
tail
own PC 0.69 other PC 0.47 0.22*/** 0.074 0.021 one
Comparison 2 - Individual Decisions in Identity vs Control Sessions
situation hiring
rate
situation hiring
rate
Difference RROT
U
p-value
regress.
tail
own PC Identity 0.69 Control 0.63 0.06 0.593 0.282 one
other PC Identity 0.47 Control 0.63 -0.16/** -0.857 0.049 one
Comparison 3 - Joint Decisions in Identity Sessions
situation hiring
rate
situation hiring
rate
Difference p-value
WSRT
p-value
regress.
tail
own PC 0.84 other PC 0.72 0.12**/*** 0.031 0.001 one
own DM own PC 0.84 other DM own PC 0.84 0.00 - 0.5 one
own DM own PC 0.84 own DM other PC 0.72 0.12*/** 0.094 0.028 one
other DM own PC 0.84 other DM other PC 0.72 0.12 0.375 0.226 two
own DM other PC 0.72 other DM other PC 0.72 0.00 - 0.5 one
Comparison 4 - Joint Decisions in Identity vs Control Sessions
situation hiring
rate
situation hiring
rate
Difference RROT
U
p-value
regress.
tail
own PC Identity 0.84 Control 0.69 0.15**/*** 2.894 0.002 one
other PC Identity 0.72 Control 0.69 0.03 0.627 0.734 one
own DM own PC 0.84 Control 0.69 0.15***/*** 4.126 0.001 one
other DM own PC 0.84 Control 0.69 0.15* 2.200 0.400 two
own DM other PC 0.72 Control 0.69 0.03 0.627 0.699 one
other DM other PC 0.72 Control 0.69 0.03 0.366 0.755 two
Comparison 5 - Joint vs Individual Decisions in Control Sessions
situation hiring
rate
situation hiring
rate
Difference p-value
WSRT
p-value
regress.
tail
Joint 0.69 Indiv. 0.63 0.06* 0.063 0.240 two
Comparison 6 - Joint vs Individual Decisions in Identity Sessions
situation hiring
rate
situation hiring
rate
Difference p-value
WSRT
p-value
regress.
tail
Joint 0.78 Indiv. 0.58 0.20**/*** 0.016 0.000 two
Joint own PC 0.84 Indiv. own PC 0.69 0.15/** 0.125 0.046 two
Joint other PC 0.72 Indiv. other PC 0.47 0.25**/*** 0.020 0.000 two
own DM own PC 0.84 Indiv. own PC 0.69 0.17/* 0.156 0.057 two
other DM own PC 0.84 Indiv. own PC 0.69 0.17/* 0.156 0.057 two
own DM other PC 0.72 Indiv. other PC 0.47 0.25**/*** 0.031 0.003 two
other DM other PC 0.72 Indiv. other PC 0.47 0.25*/** 0.078 0.020 two
Notes. WSRT: Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test; RROT: Robust Rank Order Test
p-value regress.: based on tests using the estimated regression coefficients
* significant at 10% level; ** at 5% level; *** at 1% level;
column 5: sign. based on column 6/column 7; one/two = one-/two-tailed tests
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Appendix B. Regression Analysis
In this Appendix we present regression analysis for the decision makers’ hiring
decisions and we show that it confirms the findings based on non-parametric
statistical tests reported in the main text and in the tables in Appendix A.
There are again four subsections, each focusing on one of the four questions we
are interested in: First, is there discrimination in individual decisions? Second, is
there discrimination in joint decisions? Third, does the identity of the co-decision
maker matter for whether discrimination arises in joint decisions? Fourth, do
decision makers behave differently in joint and in individual decisions?
Discrimination in Individual Decisions
Table 5: Discrimination in Individual Decisions
GLS Random Effects: dependent variable hire, control and identity sessions
(1) (2)
own PC 0.02 -0.02
(0.08) (0.10)
other PC -0.01 0.14
(0.10) (0.13)
PS2 0.08
(0.06)
own PC × PS2 0.08
(0.13)
other PC × PS2 -0.30***
(0.11)
constant 0.59*** 0.55***
(0.05) (0.06)
observations 256 256
prob > chi2 0.94 0.05
Notes. * significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level
with session random effects, robust standard errors clustered at the session level
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In each case, we run the corresponding regressions and use the estimated
regression coefficients to test the hypotheses presented in section 4 of the main
text. The tests based on the estimated regression coefficients are Chi-squared
tests of differences of two linear combinations of coefficients. In case of one-sided
hypotheses tests we use the approximation to the standard normal distribution
to derive the p-values.
In Table 5 we present regressions of the binary dependent variable hire on
a number of explanatory variables, including all observations from individual
decisions in both control and identity sessions. The equation for regression (1)
in Table 5 is:
hirei = β0 + β1 own PCi + β2 other PCi + i (1)
where own PCi = 1 if the candidate is of the own group and own PCi = 0
if the candidate is of the other group and in control sessions; other PCi = 1
if the candidate is of the other group and other PCi = 0 if the candidate is
of the own group and in control sessions. In Regression (1) in Table 5 the
constant β0 = 0.59 is equal to the hiring rate in individual decisions in control
sessions. The hiring rate of own group candidates in individual decisions in
identity sessions is given by β0 + β1 = 0.61. The hiring rate of other group
candidates in individual decisions in identity sessions is β0 + β2 = 0.58. Note
that these numbers correspond to the ones in Comparison 1 in Table 2 (Appendix
A).
Regression specification (1) does not provide evidence that the group identity
of the candidate affects hiring in individual decisions. The coefficient estimates
for β1 and β2 are small and not statistically significant. Likewise, a test of
β0 + β1 = β0 + β2 does not reveal any statistically significant difference between
hiring of own and of other group candidates in identity sessions. However, the
p-value for regression specification (1) indicates that we cannot reject the null
hypothesis of no joint significance of the parameters. The equation for regression
(2) in Table 5 is:
hirei = β0 + β1 own PCi + β2 other PCi + β3 PS2i
+ β4 own PCi × PS2i + β5 other PCi × PS2i + i (2)
In (2) we include the parameter set of the decision situation as an additional
explanatory variable with PS2i = 1 if the decision is under parameter set 2 and
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PS2i = 0 if it is under parameter set 1. By also including interaction terms,
regression (2) allows for the effect of own (other) group identity on the hiring
rate to depend on the parameter set. As Table 5 shows the estimated coefficient
β5 is large and statistically significant at the α = 0.01 level. This is indicative of
strong negative discrimination of other group candidates in individual decisions
under parameter set 2. Using the coefficient estimates from this regression we
find the same hiring rates as those in Comparisons 1 and 2 in Tables 3 and 4.
That is, using the coefficient estimates from regression (2) we find that the
hiring rate of own group candidates under parameter set 2, β0 + β1 + β3 + β4
= 0.69 is significantly higher than the hiring rate of other group candidates
under parameter set 2 (equal to β0 + β2 + β3 + β5 = 0.47). The difference of
22 percentage points is statistically significant at the α = 0.05 level (p-value
= 0.021, one-sided). A test on the difference between the hiring rate of other
group candidates under PS2 (0.47) and the hiring rate of candidates under PS2
in control session (β0 + β3 = 0.63) shows that the difference of - 0.16 is also
significant at the α = 0.05 level (p-value = 0.049, one-sided). This is in line with
the results from Comparisons 1 and 2 in Table 4 and supports Result 1 (in the
main text) of substantial and significant negative discrimination against other
group candidates in individual decisions under parameter set 2. The coefficients
estimated under regression (2) are jointly significant (Prob > chi2 = 0.05).
Discrimination in Joint Decisions
Table 6 above presents our results on discrimination in joint decisions. The
equation for regression (3) is:
hirei = β0 + β1 own PCi + β2 other PCi + i (3)
The hiring rate of candidates in control sessions estimated in (3) is β0 = 0.62.
The hiring rate of own group candidates in joint decisions in identity sessions
is β0 + β1 = 0.73. The hiring rate of other group candidates in joint decisions
in identity sessions is β0 + β2 = 0.66. These hiring rates are the same as those
reported in Comparisons 3 and 4 in Table 2.
The coefficient β1 in regression (3) is positive and statistically significant,
indicating that the hiring rate of own group candidates in joint decisions in
identity sessions is 11 percentage points higher than the hiring rate of candidates
in joint decisions in control sessions (p-value = 0.029, one-sided). This is in line
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Table 6: Discrimination in Joint Decisions
GLS Random Effects: dependent variable hire, control and identity sessions
(3) (4)
own PC 0.11* 0.06
(0.06) (0.10)
other PC 0.05 0.06
(0.05) (0.08)
PS2 0.14**
(0.06)
own PC × PS2 0.09
(0.10)
other PC × PS2 -0.03
(0.10)
constant 0.62*** 0.55***
(0.03) (0.06)
observations 384 384
prob > chi2 0.17 0.00
Notes. * significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level
with session random effects, robust standard errors clustered at the session level
with strong positive discrimination in favor of the own group in joint decisions.
Regression (4) adds the parameter set as an explanatory variable and also
includes interaction terms:
hirei = β0 + β1 own PCi + β2 other PCi + β3 PS2i
+ β4 own PCi × PS2i + β5 other PCi × PS2i + i (4)
In regression (4) the estimated coefficient β3 is statistically significant,
indicating more hiring of candidates under parameter set 2 than under parameter
set 1 in joint decisions. Using the coefficients from the regression, we find that the
hiring rates of candidates under parameter set 1 and parameter set 2 in control
sessions, and of own and of other group candidates under parameter set 1 and
parameter set 2 in identity sessions correspond to those reported in Comparisons
3 and 4 in Tables 3 and 4. We find significant differences on the following two
comparisons. In joint decisions under parameter set 2 the hiring rate of own
group candidates β0 + β1 + β3 + β4 = 0.84 is substantially and significantly
higher than that of other group candidates β0 + β2 + β3 + β5 = 0.72 (p-value
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= 0.001, one-sided). Also under parameter set 2 the hiring rate of own group
candidates in joint decisions in identity sessions β0 + β1 + β3 + β4 = 0.84 is
substantially and significantly higher than the hiring rate of candidates in joint
decisions in control sessions β0 + β3 = 0.69 (p-value = 0.002, one-sided). The
analysis of the regressions in Table 6 thus confirms Result 2 in the main text.
Co-Decision Maker Identity and Discrimination in Joint
Decisions
Table 7: Co-Decision Maker Identity and Discrimination
GLS Random Effects: dependent variable hire, control and identity sessions
(5) (6)
own PC 0.05 -0.05
(0.07) (0.11)
other PC 0.05 0.08
(0.08) (0.11)
PS2 0.14**
(0.06)
own DM -0.02 -0.03
(0.07) (0.13)
own PC × PS2 0.20
(0.13)
other PC × PS2 -0.05
(0.14)
own PC × own DM 0.13 0.25*
(0.09) (0.15)
PS2 × own DM 0.03
(0.21)
PS2 × own PC × own DM -0.25
(0.24)
constant 0.62*** 0.55***
(0.03) (0.06)
observations 384 384
prob > chi2 0.12 0.00
Notes. * significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level
with session random effects, robust standard errors clustered at the session level
We now look at the question whether discrimination arises in decisions with
own (with other) group co-decision maker. The equation for regression (5) in
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Table 7 is:
hirei = β0 + β1 own PCi + β2 other PCi + β3 own DMi
+ β4 own PCi × own DMi + i (5)
where own DMi = 1 if the co-decision maker is from the own group and
own DMi = 0 if the co-decision maker is from the other group and in control
sessions. All the hiring rates of candidates in joint decisions in control sessions,
and of own and of other group candidates in joint decisions with own and with
other group decision makers in identity sessions estimated on the basis of the
regression coefficients from regression (5) correspond to those in Comparisons 3
and 4 in Table 2. Using the estimated coefficients, we find that the following
differences are significant. The hiring rate of own group candidates when deciding
with own group co-decision maker β0 +β1 +β3 +β4 = 0.78 is significantly higher
than the hiring rate of own group candidates when deciding with other group co-
decision maker β0+β1 = 0.67 (p-value = 0.030, one-sided). The hiring rate of own
group candidates when deciding with own group co-decision maker β0+β1+β3+β4
= 0.78 is significantly higher than the hiring rate of other group candidates when
deciding with own group co-decision maker β0 +β2 +β3 = 0.66 (p-value = 0.013,
one-sided). The hiring rate of own group candidates when deciding with own
group co-decision maker β0 + β1 + β3 + β4 = 0.78 is significantly higher than
the hiring rate of candidates in joint decisions in control sessions β0 = 0.62 (p-
value = 0.005, one-sided). The last two findings above indicate strong positive
discrimination in favor of the own group in joint decisions with own group co-
decision maker.
The equation for regression (6) is:
hirei = β0 + β1 own PCi + β2 other PCi + β3 PS2i + β4 own DMi
+ β5 own PCi × PS2i + β6 other PCi × PS2i + β7 own PCi × own DMi
+ β8 PS2i × own DMi + β9 PS2i × own PCi × own DMi + i (6)
In regression (6), the coefficient β3 is statistically significant. So is the
coefficient β7 on the interaction term of own group candidate with own group
decision maker. The hiring rates calculated using the coefficients from regression
(6) are the same as those in Comparison 3 and Comparison 4 in Tables 3 and 4.
Tests based on the coefficients reveal the following. Under parameter set 1 the
hiring rate of own group candidates when deciding with own group co-decision
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maker β0 + β1 + β4 + β7 = 0.72 is substantially and significantly higher than the
hiring rate of own group candidates when deciding with other group co-decision
maker β0 + β1 = 0.50 (p-value = 0.031, one-sided). Under parameter set 1 the
hiring rate of own group candidates when deciding with own group co-decision
maker β0 + β1 + β4 + β7 = 0.72 is substantially and significantly higher than the
hiring rate of candidates in joint decisions in control sessions β0 = 0.55 (p-value
= 0.067, one-sided).
Under parameter set 2 the hiring rate of own group candidates when deciding
with own group co-decision maker β0 + β1 + β3 + β4 + β5 + β7 + β8 + β9 =
0.84 is substantially and significantly higher than the hiring rate of other group
candidates when deciding with own group co-decision maker β0 + β2 + β3 + β4 +
β6 + β8 = 0.72 (p-value = 0.028, one-sided). And again under parameter set
2 the hiring rate of own group candidate when deciding with own group co-
decision maker β0 + β1 + β3 + β4 + β5 + β7 + β8 + β9 = 0.84 is substantially and
significantly higher than the hiring rate of candidates in joint decisions in control
sessions β0 + β3 = 0.69 (p-value = 0.001, one-sided). These findings are in line
with our Results 3a and 3b in the paper.
Differences in Behavior in Joint versus Individual
Decisions
The regressions in Table 8 test whether there are any differences in individual
hiring rates in joint versus individual decisions in control sessions. The equations
for the regressions in Table 8 are:
hirei = β0 + β1 jointi + i (7)
hirei = β0 + β1 jointi + β2 PS2i
+ β3 jointi × PS2i + i (8)
where jointi = 1 if the decision is joint and jointi = 0 if the decision is
individual. Regressions (7) and (8) do not present significant evidence for a
difference in hiring rates in joint versus individual decisions in control sessions,
both when we do not and when we do control for the effect of the parameter set
on the hiring rates. These results are in line with our findings in Comparison
3 in Tables 2, 3, and 4 and thus confirm our Result 4a in the text. Using the
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Table 8: Differences Individual/Joint Decisions in Control Sessions
GLS Random Effects: dependent variable hire, control sessions
(7) (8)
joint 0.03 -0.00
(0.07) (0.10)
PS2 0.08
(0.06)
joint × PS2 0.06
(0.09)
constant 0.59*** 0.55***
(0.05) (0.06)
observations 256 256
prob > chi2 0.65 0.02
Notes. * significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level
with session random effects, robust standard errors clustered at the session level
coefficient estimates from regression (8), our tests comparing joint with individual
decisions under parameter set 1 (parameter set 2, respectively), cannot reject the
null hypothesis of no difference.
We now turn to differences in hiring in joint versus individual decisions in
identity sessions. We conduct a series of regressions, progressively including
more explanatory variables. The first set of regressions mirrors the regressions
for the case of control sessions.
Thus, the equations for regressions (9) and (10) are:
hirei = β0 + β1 jointi + i (9)
hirei = β0 + β1 jointi + β2 PS2i
+ β3 jointi × PS2i + i (10)
The coefficient β1 in regression (9) is positive and statistically significant,
indicating that the hiring rate in joint decisions in identity sessions is 10
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Table 9: Differences Individual/Joint Decisions in Identity Sessions
GLS Random Effects: dependent variable hire, identity sessions
(9) (10)
joint 0.10** -0.00
(0.04) (0.06)
PS2 -0.03
(0.07)
joint × PS2 0.20***
(0.07)
constant 0.59*** 0.61***
(0.06) (0.08)
observations 384 384
prob > Chi2 0.02 0.00
Notes. * significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level
with session random effects, robust standard errors clustered at the session level
percentage points higher than the hiring rate in individual decisions in identity
sessions. This is in line with Comparison 6 in Table 2.
Regression (10) includes also the parameter set and interaction terms. It
shows that if we allow for the effect of individual versus joint decision to depend
on the parameter set by including an interaction term, we find that the increase
in hiring in joint decisions in identity session occurs only under parameter set 2,
but not under parameter set 1. A test of the difference in hiring rates in joint
(β0 + β1 + β2 + β3 = 0.78) versus individual (β0 + β2 = 0.58) decisions under
parameter set 2 in identity sessions shows that the difference of 0.20 is significant
(Prob > Chi2 = 0.000). This is in line with the effect that we find in Comparison
6 in Table 3. Thus, our findings from the regression analysis of the differences
between individual and joint decisions in identity sessions confirm Result 4b in
the main text.
We now also include the identity of the candidate to test whether there are
differences in joint versus individual decisions towards own (towards other) group
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candidates in identity sessions. The equation for regression (11) in Table 10 is:
hirei = β0 + β1 jointi + β2 own PCi
+ β3 jointi × own PCi + i (11)
Table 10: Differences Individual/Joint Decisions, incl. PC Identity
GLS Random Effects: dependent variable hire, identity sessions
(11) (12)
joint 0.09 -0.08
(0.07) (0.12)
own PC 0.03 -0.16
(0.11) (0.15)
PS2 -0.22**
(0.10)
joint × own PC 0.03 0.16
(0.10) (0.17)
joint × PS2 0.33***
(0.13)
own × PS2 0.38**
(0.16)
joint × own × PS2 -0.25
(0.21)
constant 0.58*** 0.69***
(0.09) (0.12)
observations 384 384
prob > chi2 0.08 0.00
Notes. * significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level
with session random effects, robust standard errors clustered at the session level
When using the coefficients from regression (11) to compare the hiring rate
of own group candidates in joint decisions (β0 + β1 + β2 + β3 = 0.73) with the
hiring rate of own group candidates in individual decisions (β0 + β2 = 0.61), the
difference is statistically significant (Prob > Chi2 = 0.0412). The difference in
hiring rates of other group candidates in joint (β0 +β1 = 0.66) and in individual
decisions (β0 = 0.58) is not statistically significant. These findings are in line
with Comparison 6 in Table 2. The next regression also includes the parameter
set as an explanatory variable and allows for interactions. The equation for
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regression (12) is:
hirei = β0 + β1 jointi + β2 own PCi + β3 PS2i
+ β4 jointi × own PCi + β5 jointi × PS2i + β6 own PCi × PS2i
+ β7 jointi × own PCi × PS2i + i (12)
The coefficient β3 is negative and statistically significant indicating less hiring
of candidates under PS2 than under PS1. The coefficient β5 is positive and
statistically significant indicating more hiring of candidates under PS2 in joint
decisions. The coefficient β6 indicates more hiring of own group candidates under
PS2. Comparing the hiring rate of other group candidates under parameter set
2 in joint decisions (β0 +β1 +β3 +β5 = 0.72) with the hiring rate of other group
candidates under parameter set 2 in individual decisions (β0 + β3 = 0.47), we
find that the difference is statistically significant (Prob > Chi2 = 0.000). The
difference in hiring rate of own group candidates under parameter set 2 in joint
decisions (β0 +β1 +β2 +β3 +β4 +β5 +β6 +β7 = 0.84) and in individual decisions
(β0 + β2 + β3 + β6 = 0.69) is also statistically significant (Prob > Chi2 = 0.046).
This confirms our findings in Comparison 6 in Table 4.
Finally, we look at the differences between individual and joint decisions in
identity sessions, taking into account the identity of the co-decision maker in
joint decisions. The equation for regression (13) is:
hirei = β0 + β1 own PCi + β2 own DMi + β3 other DMi
+ β4 own PCi × own DMi + β5 other PCi × other DMi + i (13)
None of the coefficients is statistically significant. An individual hires
more own group candidates when deciding with own group co-decision maker
β0 +β1 +β2 +β4 = 0.78 than in individual decisions β0 +β1 = 0.61 (Prob > chi2
= 0.029). This is in line with Comparison 3 in Table 2.
Regression (14) also includes the parameter set as an explanatory variable
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Table 11: Differences Individual/Joint Decisions, incl. co-DM Identity
GLS Random Effects: dependent variable hire, identity sessions
(13) (14)
own PC 0.03 -0.16
(0.11) (0.15)
own DM 0.08 -0.09
(0.09) (0.15)
other DM 0.06 -0.03
(0.05) (0.09)
PS2 -0.22**
(0.10)
own PC × own DM 0.09 0.28
(0.13) (0.22)
other PC × other DM 0.03 -0.03
(0.07) (0.15)
own PC × PS2 0.38**
(0.16)
own DM × PS2 0.34**
(0.16)
other DM × PS2 0.19
(0.14)
own PC × own DM × PS2 -0.38*
(0.22)
other PC × other DM × PS2 0.13
(0.27)
constant 0.58*** 0.69***
(0.09) (0.12)
observations 384 384
prob > chi2 0.00 -
Notes. * significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level
with session random effects, robust standard errors clustered at the session level
and interaction terms. The equation is:
hirei = β0 + β1own PCi + β2 own DMi + β3 other DMi + β4 PS2i
+ β5 own PCi × own DMi + β6 other PCi × other DMi
+ β7 own PCi × PS2i + β8 own DMi × PS2i
+ β9 other DMi × PS2i + β10 own PCi × own DMi × PS2i
+ β11 other PCi × other DMi × PS2i + i (14)
The hiring rates estimated on the basis of the coefficients from regression
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(14) are the same as those in Comparison 5 in Tables 3 and 4. The following
differences are significant. Under parameter set 2 individuals hire more other
group candidates when deciding with other group co-decision maker β0 + β3 +
β4 + β6 + β9 + β11 = 0.72 than when deciding individually β0 + β4 = 0.47 (Prob
> chi2 = 0.020). Under parameter set 2 individuals hire more other group
candidates when deciding with own group co-decision maker β0 + β2 + β4 + β8
= 0.72 than when deciding individually β0 + β4 = 0.47 (Prob > Chi2 = 0.003).
Under parameter set 2 individuals hire more own group candidates when deciding
with other group co-decision maker β0 +β1 +β3 +β4 +β7 +β9 = 0.84 than when
deciding individually β0+β1+β4+β7 = 0.69 (Prob > Chi2 = 0.057). And under
parameter set 2 individuals hire more own group candidates when deciding with
own group co-decision maker β0 + β1 + β2 + β4 + β5 + β7 + β8 + β10 = 0.84 than
when deciding individually β0 + β1 + β4 + β7 = 0.69 (Prob > Chi2 = 0.0572).
The results related to Tables 10 and 11 support our Result 4c in the main text.
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Appendix C. Candidates’ Beliefs
The candidates in the experiment were given questions about their beliefs on
decision makers’ behavior. Below we present a table with our analysis of the
candidates’ beliefs. The design is balanced so half the candidates were asked what
a decision maker of the own group would do and the other half were asked what a
decision maker of the other group would do in a given situation. As the number
of candidates in the experiment was half the number of the decision makers, the
results on the candidates’ beliefs are based on a relatively small sample size. We
nevertheless conducted the same non-parametric statistical tests of significance
on the candidates beliefs as on decision makers’ behavior, aggregating over the
two sets of parameters and aggregating over beliefs about own and other group
decision makers. The results are presented in Table 12. The following differences
are significant. We find that project candidates expect significantly more hiring
of own group candidates in joint decisions in identity sessions (0.66) than in
joint decisions in control sessions (0.52) (difference statistically significant at
α = 0.05). And in particular they expect more hiring of own group candidates
in joint decisions with own group decision maker 0.69 than of candidates in joint
decisions in control sessions 0.52 (difference statistically significant at α = 0.05).
Thus, the candidates’ beliefs are in line with expectations of strong and positive
own group favoritism in joint decisions. And this is in line with decision makers’
behavior (see Result 3 in the main text).
50
Table 12: Candidates’ Beliefs on Hiring Decisions
Comparison 1 - Individual Decisions in Identity Sessions
situation hiring
rate
situation hiring
rate
Difference p-value
WSRT
tail
own PC 0.69 other PC 0.63 0.06 0.313 one
Comparison 2 - Individual Decisions in Identity vs Control Sessions
situation hiring
rate
situation hiring
rate
Difference RROT
U
tail
own PC Identity 0.69 Control 0.72 -0.03 -0.561 one
other PC Identity 0.63 Control 0.72 -0.09 -0.944 one
Comparison 3 - Joint Decisions in Identity Sessions
situation hiring
rate
situation hiring
rate
Difference p-value
WSRT
tail
own PC 0.66 other PC 0.56 0.10 0.188 one
own DM own PC 0.69 other DM own PC 0.63 0.06 0.313 one
own DM own PC 0.69 own DM other PC 0.56 0.13 0.125 one
other DM own PC 0.63 other DM other PC 0.56 0.07 0.625 two
own DM other PC 0.56 other DM other PC 0.56 0.00 - one
Comparison 4 - Joint Decisions in Identity vs Control Sessions
situation hiring
rate
situation hiring
rate
Difference RROT
U
tail
own PC Identity 0.66 Control 0.52 0.14** 2.104 one
other PC Identity 0.56 Control 0.52 0.04 0.413 one
own DM own PC 0.69 Control 0.52 0.17** 2.276 one
other DM own PC 0.63 Control 0.52 0.11 1.200 two
own DM other PC 0.56 Control 0.52 0.04 0.916 one
other DM other PC 0.56 Control 0.52 0.04 0.625 two
Comparison 5 - Joint vs Individual Decisions in Control Sessions
situation hiring
rate
situation hiring
rate
Difference p-value
WSRT
tail
Joint 0.52 Indiv. 0.72 -0.20* 0.078 two
Comparison 6 - Joint vs Individual Decisions in Identity Sessions
situation hiring
rate
situation hiring
rate
Difference p-value
WSRT
tail
Joint 0.61 Indiv. 0.66 -0.05 0.313 two
Joint own PC 0.66 Indiv. own PC 0.69 -0.03 - two
Joint other PC 0.56 Indiv. other PC 0.63 -0.07 0.438 two
own DM own PC 0.69 Indiv. own PC 0.69 0.00 - two
other DM own PC 0.63 Indiv. own PC 0.69 -0.06 - two
own DM other PC 0.56 Indiv. other PC 0.63 -0.07 0.563 two
other DM other PC 0.56 Indiv. other PC 0.63 -0.07 0.5 two
Notes. WSRT: Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test; RROT: Robust Rank Order Test;
* significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; one/two = one-/two-tailed tests
‘-‘ insufficient number of observations for statistical testing
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Appendix D. Experimental Instructions
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[GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS CONTROL SESSIONS] 
 
All participants in this session have the following identical instructions. 
 
Introduction 
 
Welcome to this experimental session and thank you for participating. The 
instructions for this experiment are simple and if you pay attention you can 
gain some money that will be paid to you in cash at the end of the session. 
From now on till the end of this experimental session you may not 
communicate with each other, unless explicitly told by the experimenter you 
may do so. If you have a question simply raise your hand and an 
experimenter will come to help you individually and in private. Ask your 
questions quietly. Make sure that all mobile phones are switched off and 
placed away. It is very important that you follow these rules, otherwise we will 
exclude you from the experiment and from all payments. 
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Instructions  
 
We will now describe the experiment. In it you will be asked to make a number 
of decisions. For each decision, you will be randomly and anonymously 
matched with one or two other participants. You will never know whom you 
are matched with and they will never know who you are. There will be two 
types of decision situations. We will give an example of each and ask you 
some control questions only to make sure that you have understood the 
decision-making situations correctly before proceeding. 
 
1) Situations in which one decision-maker makes a decision about a project 
candidate as in Example 1 below: 
 
Example 1 
There is a decision-maker. (S)he has a budget of £1.23. (S)he faces a randomly selected 
project candidate. (S)he has to decide whether to assign a project to this candidate or not.  
 If (s)he decides to assign the project to the candidate, then the project will be 
assigned to the candidate. In that case the decision-maker pays the candidate £1.23 
for his/her services. The decision-maker does not know in advance whether the 
candidate will complete the project successfully or not, but (s)he knows that chances 
of success are 40 in 100. If the project is completed successfully, the decision-maker 
will get £2.00. If the project is not completed successfully, the decision-maker will get 
£0.50. 
 If (s)he decides not to assign the project to the candidate, then the project will not be 
assigned to the candidate. In that case the decision-maker simply keeps the £1.23 for 
him/herself. 
 
Please, answer the following control questions after carefully reading 
the above example. These questions are designed only to check that 
you have understood the decision situation before proceeding to the 
decision-making stage. The payoffs indicated in the examples are to 
check your understanding only. They are not relevant for payment.  
 
Control Questions on Example 1 
1) What is the number of decision-makers in this example?    ….. 
2) What is the budget of the decision-maker?                ….. 
3) How much will the decision-maker have to pay the project candidate if the 
decision-maker assigns the project to him/her?                ….. 
4)  What are the chances that the project is completed successfully?                     ….. 
5) How much will the decision-maker get if the project is completed successfully? ..... 
6) How much will the decision-maker get if the project is not completed successfully? 
7) How much will the decision-maker keep for him/herself if the decision-maker does 
not assign the project to the project candidate?            ….. 
8) How much will the project candidate get if the decision-maker assigns the project 
to him/her?                    ….. 
9) How much will the project candidate get if the decision-maker does not assign the 
project to him/her?                   ….. 
 
When you are ready with your answers, please raise your hand. 
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2) Situations in which two decision-makers, who decide independently of 
each other make decisions about a project candidate as in Example 2 below: 
 
Example 2 
There is a decision-maker. (S)he is randomly paired with another decision-maker. Each of 
them has a budget of £1.23. The two decision-makers face a randomly selected project 
candidate. Each of the two decision-makers has to decide independently whether to assign a 
project to this candidate or not. 
 If both decision-makers decide to assign the project to the candidate, then the project 
will be assigned to the candidate. In that case each of the two decision-makers pays 
the candidate £1.23 for his/her services. The decision-makers do not know in 
advance whether the candidate will complete the project successfully or not, but each 
of them knows that chances of success are 30 in 100. If the project is completed 
successfully, each of the two decision-makers will get £3.60. If the project is not 
completed successfully, each of the two decision-makers will get £0.40. 
 If both decision-makers decide not to assign the project to the candidate, then the 
project will not be assigned to the candidate. In that case each of the two decision-
makers simply keeps the £1.23 for him/herself. 
 If the two decision-makers make different decisions, no project assignment 
decision can be implemented and their disagreement will cost each of them 
£1.00 (to be deducted from each decision-maker’s budget of £1.23).  
 
Control Questions on Example 2 
10) What is the number of decision-makers in this example?   ….. 
11) What is the budget of each decision-maker?                           ….. 
12) How much will each decision-maker have to pay to the project candidate in case 
the project is assigned to the candidate?      ….. 
13) What are the chances that the project is completed successfully?               …..  
14) How much will each decision-maker get in case the project is completed 
successfully?          ….. 
15) And in case the project is not completed successfully?            ….. 
16) How much will each decision-maker keep for him/herself if both decision-makers 
do not assign the project to the candidate?              ….. 
17) How much will each decision-maker have to pay out of his/her budget in case of 
disagreement with the other?                           ….. 
18) How much will the project candidate get if both decision-makers assign the 
project to him/her?         ….. 
19) How much will the project candidate get if both decision-makers do not assign 
the project to him/her?        ….. 
20) How many decision-makers have to make the decision to assign the project to 
the candidate for the project to be assigned? 1 or 2?    ….. 
21) How much will the project candidate get if one decision-maker assigns the project 
to him/her, but the other decision-maker does not?     ….. 
When you are ready with your answers, please raise your hand. 
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We are now ready to proceed to the next stage, which will consist of four 
project assignment questions that have a similar structure as the examples 
just considered. Some of you will be randomly assigned the role of decision-
makers and others will be randomly assigned the role of project candidates. 
You will be given your role on the next handout and will keep it until the end of 
the experiment. You must keep your role confidential. 
 
In each decision-making question you will be randomly and anonymously 
matched with one or two other participants. You will never know whom you 
are matched with and they will never know who you are. Your payoff from 
each question will be calculated at the end of the experimental session based 
on your decisions and on the decisions of the people you were matched with. 
All relevant payoff information for each question will be given in the following 
sheets. All payoffs are in pounds sterling (GBP).  
 
Whenever we need to determine whether a project is successful or not, a 
draw will be made out of a bag, containing red and black chips. The number of 
red and black chips in the bag will correspond to the chances that a project is 
successful versus unsuccessful given in the respective question. If a red chip 
is drawn, the project is successful. If a black chip is drawn, the project is not 
successful. In many cases when a draw needs to be made, there will be more 
than one person affected by this draw. Only one of these people will make the 
draw when payments are being calculated and its outcome will be used for 
payment to the others affected. 
 
Your total payoff will be calculated at the end of the experimental session and 
will be the sum of your payoffs from all decisions made on the next two pages 
plus the participation bonus of £3. You will be paid in private. You will not be 
told the answers and the payoffs of the other participants and they will not be 
told yours. 
 
All questions must be answered by writing either “yes” or “no” in the 
answer field provided. 
 
Do you have any questions?  
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[DECISION MAKER CONTROL SESSIONS] 
 
You are a decision-maker. This is your role for all remaining questions.  
 
Question 1 
You are a decision-maker. You have a budget of £3.42. You face a randomly 
selected project candidate. You have to decide whether to assign a project to 
this candidate or not.  
 If you decide to assign the project to the candidate, then the project will 
be assigned to the candidate. In that case you pay the candidate £3.42 
for his/her services. You do not know in advance whether the candidate 
will complete the project successfully or not, but you know that chances 
of success are 45 in 100. If the project is completed successfully, you 
will get £6.20. If the project is not completed successfully, you will get 
£0.60. 
 If you decide not to assign the project to the candidate, then the project 
will not be assigned to the candidate. In that case you simply keep the 
£3.42 for yourself. 
 
Do you as decision-maker assign the project to the candidate or not? 
Your answer: _______ 
 
 
 
Question 2 
You are a decision-maker. You have a budget of £3.42. You face a randomly 
selected project candidate. You have to decide whether to assign a project to 
this candidate or not.  
 If you decide to assign the project to the candidate, then the project will 
be assigned to the candidate. In that case you pay the candidate £3.42 
for his/her services. You do not know in advance whether the candidate 
will complete the project successfully or not, but you know that chances 
of success are 35 in 100. If the project is completed successfully, you 
will get £9.70. If the project is not completed successfully, you will get 
£0.50. 
 If you decide not to assign the project to the candidate, then the project 
will not be assigned to the candidate. In that case you simply keep the 
£3.42 for yourself. 
 
Do you as decision-maker assign the project to the candidate or not? 
Your answer: _______ 
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Question 3 
You are a decision-maker. You are randomly paired with another decision-
maker. Each of you has a budget of £3.42. You and the other decision-maker 
face a randomly selected project candidate. Each of you has to decide 
independently whether to assign a project to this candidate or not. 
 If you both decide to assign the project to the candidate, then the 
project will be assigned to the candidate. In that case each of you pays 
the candidate £3.42 for his/her services. You do not know in advance 
whether the candidate will complete the project successfully or not, but 
each of you knows that chances of success are 35 in 100. If the project 
is completed successfully, you and the other decision-maker will each 
get £9.70. If the project is not completed successfully, you and the 
other decision-maker will each get £0.50. 
 If you both decide not to assign the project to the candidate, then the 
project will not be assigned to the candidate. In that case each of you 
simply keeps the £3.42 for him/herself. 
 If you and the other decision-maker make different decisions, no 
project assignment decision can be implemented and your 
disagreement will cost each of you £3.00 (to be deducted from 
each budget of £3.42).  
 
Do you as decision-maker assign the project to the candidate or not? 
Your answer: _______ 
 
 
 
Question 4 
You are a decision-maker. You are randomly paired with another decision-
maker. Each of you has a budget of £3.42. You and the other decision-maker 
face a randomly selected project candidate. Each of you has to decide 
independently whether to assign a project to this candidate or not. 
 If you both decide to assign the project to the candidate, then the 
project will be assigned to the candidate. In that case each of you pays 
the candidate £3.42 for his/her services. You do not know in advance 
whether the candidate will complete the project successfully or not, but 
each of you knows that chances of success are 45 in 100. If the project 
is completed successfully, you and the other decision-maker will each 
get £6.20. If the project is not completed successfully, you and the 
other decision-maker will each get £0.60. 
 If you both decide not to assign the project to the candidate, then the 
project will not be assigned to the candidate. In that case each of you 
simply keeps the £3.42 for him/herself. 
 If you and the other decision-maker make different decisions, no 
project assignment decision can be implemented and your 
disagreement will cost each of you £3.00 (to be deducted from 
each budget of £3.42).  
 
Do you as decision-maker assign the project to the candidate or not? 
Your answer: _______ 
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[PROJECT CANDIDATE CONTROL SESSIONS] 
 
You are a project candidate. This is your role for all remaining 
questions.  
 
In the boxes in small print you see the questions as given to decision-makers. 
In each answer slot provided, please answer whether you think the decision-
maker will assign the project to the project candidate or not. The decision of 
the decision-maker may be about you in some questions, but it will not be 
about you in all questions. For each correct answer you will get £3. 
 
 
 
Question as seen by decision-maker 
 
You are a decision-maker. You have a budget of £3.42. You face a randomly selected project 
candidate. You have to decide whether to assign a project to this candidate or not.  
 If you decide to assign the project to the candidate, then the project will be assigned 
to the candidate. In that case you pay the candidate £3.42 for his/her services. You 
do not know in advance whether the candidate will complete the project successfully 
or not, but you know that chances of success are 45 in 100. If the project is 
completed successfully, you will get £6.20. If the project is not completed 
successfully, you will get £0.60.  
 If you decide not to assign the project to the candidate, then the project will not be 
assigned to the candidate. In that case you simply keep the £3.42 for yourself. 
 
 
Question 1: Do you think this decision-maker above will assign the project to 
the candidate or not?  
Your answer: _______ 
 
 
 
Question as seen by decision-maker 
 
You are a decision-maker. You have a budget of £3.42. You face a randomly selected project 
candidate. You have to decide whether to assign a project to this candidate or not.  
 If you decide to assign the project to the candidate, then the project will be assigned 
to the candidate. In that case you pay the candidate £3.42 for his/her services. You 
do not know in advance whether the candidate will complete the project successfully 
or not, but you know that chances of success are 35 in 100. If the project is 
completed successfully, you will get £9.70. If the project is not completed 
successfully, you will get £0.50. 
 If you decide not to assign the project to the candidate, then the project will not be 
assigned to the candidate. In that case you simply keep the £3.42 for yourself. 
 
 
Question 2: Do you think this decision-maker above will assign the project to 
the candidate or not?  
Your answer: _______ 
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Question as seen by decision-maker 
 
You are a decision-maker. You are randomly paired with another decision-maker. Each of you 
has a budget of £3.42. You and the other decision-maker face a randomly selected project 
candidate. Each of you has to decide independently whether to assign a project to this 
candidate or not. 
 If you both decide to assign the project to the candidate, then the project will be 
assigned to the candidate. In that case each of you pays the candidate £3.42 for 
his/her services. You do not know in advance whether the candidate will complete the 
project successfully or not, but each of you knows that chances of success are 45 in 
100. If the project is completed successfully, you and the other decision-maker will 
each get £6.20. If the project is not completed successfully, you and the other 
decision-maker will each get £0.60. 
 If you both decide not to assign the project to the candidate, then the project will not 
be assigned to the candidate. In that case each of you simply keeps the £3.42 for 
him/herself. 
 If you and the other decision-maker make different decisions, no project 
assignment decision can be implemented and your disagreement will cost each 
of you £3.00 (to be deducted from each budget of £3.42).  
 
Question 3: Do you think this decision-maker above will assign the project to 
the candidate or not? 
Your answer: _______ 
 
 
 
Question as seen by decision-maker 
 
You are a decision-maker. You are randomly paired with another decision-maker. Each of you 
has a budget of £3.42. You and the other decision-maker face a randomly selected project 
candidate. Each of you has to decide independently whether to assign a project to this 
candidate or not. 
 If you both decide to assign the project to the candidate, then the project will be 
assigned to the candidate. In that case each of you pays the candidate £3.42 for 
his/her services. You do not know in advance whether the candidate will complete the 
project successfully or not, but each of you knows that chances of success are 35 in 
100. If the project is completed successfully, you and the other decision-maker will 
each get £9.70. If the project is not completed successfully, you and the other 
decision-maker will each get £0.50. 
 If you both decide not to assign the project to the candidate, then the project will not 
be assigned to the candidate. In that case each of you simply keeps the £3.42 for 
him/herself. 
 If you and the other decision-maker make different decisions, no project 
assignment decision can be implemented and your disagreement will cost each 
of you £3.00 (to be deducted from each budget of £3.42).  
 
Question 4: Do you think this decision-maker above will assign the project to 
the candidate or not?  
Your answer: _______ 
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[GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS IDENTITY SESSIONS] 
 
All participants in this session have the following identical instructions. 
 
Introduction 
 
Welcome to this experimental session and thank you for participating. The 
instructions for this experiment are simple and if you pay attention you can 
gain some money that will be paid to you in cash at the end of the session. 
From now on till the end of this experimental session you may not 
communicate with each other, unless explicitly told by the experimenter you 
may do so. If you have a question simply raise your hand and an 
experimenter will come to help you individually and in private. Ask your 
questions quietly. Make sure that all mobile phones are switched off and 
placed away. It is very important that you follow these rules, otherwise we will 
exclude you from the experiment and from all payments. 
 
Before the experiment started everyone drew an envelope which contained 
either a Green or a Blue paper. You have been assigned to the Green Group 
if you received a Green paper or to the Blue Group if you received a Blue 
paper. Your group assignment will remain the same throughout the 
experiment. That is, if you drew a Green paper, you will be in the Green 
Group for the rest of the experiment, and if you drew a Blue paper, you will be 
in the Blue Group for the rest of the experiment. 
 
The experiment consists of two parts. We will start with Part 1. After Part 1 
has finished we will give you instructions for Part 2. 
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Part 1. Instructions 
 
Your group will be given eight paintings by two artists. You will have five 
minutes to study these paintings. Then you will be asked to identify the artist 
of four other paintings. Each correct answer will give you £2.00. You are 
strongly encouraged to discuss the paintings with your group members and 
get help from them or help them when answering the questions.  
 
 
 
Do you have any questions?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Part 1. Your Answers. Each correct answer will give you £2.00. 
(Please, specify Artist 1 or Artist 2 in each case.) 
 
Answer 1: Painting 1 is by ……………………………………………………… 
 
Answer 2: Painting 2 is by ……………………………………………………… 
 
Answer 3: Painting 3 is by ……………………………………………………… 
 
Answer 4: Painting 4 is by ……………………………………………………… 
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Part 2. Instructions 
We will now describe Part 2. In it you will be asked to make a number of 
decisions. For each decision, you will be randomly and anonymously matched 
with one or two other participants. You will never know whom you are 
matched with and they will never know who you are. There will be two types of 
decision situations. We will give an example of each and ask you some 
control questions only to make sure that you have understood the decision-
making situations correctly before proceeding. 
 
1) Situations in which one decision-maker makes a decision about a project 
candidate as in Example 1 below: 
 
Example 1 
There is a decision-maker. (S)he has a budget of £1.23. (S)he faces a randomly selected 
project candidate. (S)he has to decide whether to assign a project to this candidate or not.  
 If (s)he decides not to assign the project to the candidate, then the project will not be 
assigned to the candidate. In that case the decision-maker simply keeps the £1.23 for 
him/herself. 
 If (s)he decides to assign the project to the candidate, then the project will be 
assigned to the candidate. In that case the decision-maker pays the candidate £1.23 
for his/her services. The decision-maker does not know in advance whether the 
candidate will complete the project successfully or not, but (s)he knows that chances 
of success are 40 in 100. If the project is completed successfully, the decision-maker 
will get £2.00. If the project is not completed successfully, the decision-maker will get 
£0.50. 
 
Please, answer the following control questions after carefully reading 
the above example. These questions are designed only to check that 
you have understood the decision situation before proceeding to the 
decision-making stage. The payoffs indicated in the examples are to 
check your understanding only. They are not relevant for payment.  
 
Control Questions on Example 1 
1) What is the number of decision-makers in this example?    ….. 
2) What is the budget of the decision-maker?                ….. 
3) How much will the decision-maker keep for him/herself if the decision-maker does 
not assign the project to the project candidate?            ….. 
4) How much will the decision-maker have to pay the project candidate if the 
decision-maker assigns the project to him/her?                ….. 
5)  What are the chances that the project is completed successfully?                     ….. 
6) How much will the decision-maker get if the project is completed successfully? ..... 
7) How much will the decision-maker get if the project is not completed successfully? 
8) How much will the project candidate get if the decision-maker does not assign the 
project to him/her?                   ….. 
9) How much will the project candidate get if the decision-maker assigns the project 
to him/her?                    ….. 
 
When you are ready with your answers, please raise your hand. 
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2) Situations in which two decision-makers, who decide independently of 
each other make decisions about a project candidate as in Example 2 below: 
 
Example 2 
There is a decision-maker. (S)he is randomly paired with another decision-maker. Each of 
them has a budget of £1.23. The two decision-makers face a randomly selected project 
candidate. Each of the two decision-makers has to decide independently whether to assign a 
project to this candidate or not. 
 If both decision-makers decide not to assign the project to the candidate, then the 
project will not be assigned to the candidate. In that case each of the two decision-
makers simply keeps the £1.23 for him/herself. 
 If both decision-makers decide to assign the project to the candidate, then the project 
will be assigned to the candidate. In that case each of the two decision-makers pays 
the candidate £1.23 for his/her services. The decision-makers do not know in 
advance whether the candidate will complete the project successfully or not, but each 
of them knows that chances of success are 30 in 100. If the project is completed 
successfully, each of the two decision-makers will get £3.60. If the project is not 
completed successfully, each of the two decision-makers will get £0.40. 
 If the two decision-makers make different decisions, no project assignment 
decision can be implemented and their disagreement will cost each of them 
£1.00 (to be deducted from each decision-maker’s budget of £1.23).  
 
Control Questions on Example 2 
10) What is the number of decision-makers in this example?   ….. 
11) What is the budget of each decision-maker?                           ….. 
12) How much will each decision-maker keep for him/herself if both decision-makers 
do not assign the project to the candidate?              ….. 
13) How much will each decision-maker have to pay to the project candidate in case 
the project is assigned to the candidate?      ….. 
14) What are the chances that the project is completed successfully?               …..  
15) How much will each decision-maker get in case the project is completed 
successfully?          ….. 
16) And in case the project is not completed successfully?            ….. 
17) How much will each decision-maker have to pay out of his/her budget in case of 
disagreement with the other?                           ….. 
18) How much will the project candidate get if both decision-makers do not assign 
the project to him/her?        ….. 
19) How much will the project candidate get if both decision-makers assign the 
project to him/her?         ….. 
20) How many decision-makers have to make the decision to assign the project to 
the candidate for the project to be assigned? 1 or 2?    ….. 
21) How much will the project candidate get if one decision-maker assigns the project 
to him/her, but the other decision-maker does not?     ….. 
When you are ready with your answers, please raise your hand. 
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We are now ready to proceed to the next stage, which will consist of six 
project assignment questions that have a similar structure as the examples 
just considered. Some of you will be randomly assigned the role of decision-
makers and others will be randomly assigned the role of project candidates. 
You will be given your role on the next handout and will keep it until the end of 
the experiment. You must keep your role confidential. 
 
In each decision-making question you will be randomly and anonymously 
matched with one or two other participants. You will never know whom you 
are matched with and they will never know who you are. Your payoff from 
each question will be calculated at the end of the experimental session based 
on your decisions and on the decisions of the people you were matched with. 
All relevant payoff information for each question will be given in the following 
sheets. All payoffs are in pounds sterling (GBP).  
 
Whenever we need to determine whether a project is successful or not, a 
draw will be made out of a bag, containing red and black chips. The number of 
red and black chips in the bag will correspond to the chances that a project is 
successful versus unsuccessful given in the respective question. If a red chip 
is drawn, the project is successful. If a black chip is drawn, the project is not 
successful. In many cases when a draw needs to be made, there will be more 
than one person affected by this draw. Only one of these people will make the 
draw when payments are being calculated and its outcome will be used for 
payment to the others affected. 
 
Your total payoff will be calculated at the end of the experimental session and 
will be the sum of your payoffs from all decisions made in Part 1 plus from all 
decisions made on the next three pages plus the participation bonus of £3. 
You will be paid in private. You will not be told the answers and the payoffs of 
the other participants and they will not be told yours. 
 
All questions must be answered by writing either “yes” or “no” in the 
answer field provided. 
 
Do you have any questions?  
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[DECISION MAKER IDENTITY SESSIONS] 
 
You are a GREEN decision-maker. This is your role for all remaining 
questions.  
 
Question 1 
You are a GREEN decision-maker. You have a budget of £3.42. You face a 
randomly selected BLUE project candidate. You have to decide whether to 
assign a project to this candidate or not.  
 If you decide not to assign the project to the candidate, then the project 
will not be assigned to the candidate. In that case you simply keep the 
£3.42 for yourself. 
 If you decide to assign the project to the candidate, then the project will 
be assigned to the candidate. In that case you pay the candidate £3.42 
for his/her services. You do not know in advance whether the candidate 
will complete the project successfully or not, but you know that chances 
of success are 35 in 100. If the project is completed successfully, you 
will get £9.70. If the project is not completed successfully, you will get 
£0.50. 
 
Do you as decision-maker assign the project to the candidate or not? 
Your answer: _______ 
 
 
 
Question 2 
You are a GREEN decision-maker. You have a budget of £3.42. You face a 
randomly selected GREEN project candidate. You have to decide whether to 
assign a project to this candidate or not.  
 If you decide not to assign the project to the candidate, then the project 
will not be assigned to the candidate. In that case you simply keep the 
£3.42 for yourself. 
 If you decide to assign the project to the candidate, then the project will 
be assigned to the candidate. In that case you pay the candidate £3.42 
for his/her services. You do not know in advance whether the candidate 
will complete the project successfully or not, but you know that chances 
of success are 45 in 100. If the project is completed successfully, you 
will get £6.20. If the project is not completed successfully, you will get 
£0.60. 
 
Do you as decision-maker assign the project to the candidate or not? 
Your answer: _______ 
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Question 3 
You are a GREEN decision-maker. You are randomly paired with another 
GREEN decision-maker. Each of you has a budget of £3.42. You and the 
other decision-maker face a randomly selected BLUE project candidate. Each 
of you has to decide independently whether to assign a project to this 
candidate or not. 
 If you both decide not to assign the project to the candidate, then the 
project will not be assigned to the candidate. In that case each of you 
simply keeps the £3.42 for him/herself. 
 If you both decide to assign the project to the candidate, then the 
project will be assigned to the candidate. In that case each of you pays 
the candidate £3.42 for his/her services. You do not know in advance 
whether the candidate will complete the project successfully or not, but 
each of you knows that chances of success are 35 in 100. If the project 
is completed successfully, you and the other decision-maker will each 
get £9.70. If the project is not completed successfully, you and the 
other decision-maker will each get £0.50. 
 If you and the other decision-maker make different decisions, no 
project assignment decision can be implemented and your 
disagreement will cost each of you £3.00 (to be deducted from 
each budget of £3.42).  
 
Do you as decision-maker assign the project to the candidate or not? 
Your answer: _______ 
 
 
Question 4 
You are a GREEN decision-maker. You are randomly paired with a BLUE 
decision-maker. Each of you has a budget of £3.42. You and the other 
decision-maker face a randomly selected GREEN project candidate. Each of 
you has to decide independently whether to assign a project to this candidate 
or not. 
 If you both decide not to assign the project to the candidate, then the 
project will not be assigned to the candidate. In that case each of you 
simply keeps the £3.42 for him/herself. 
 If you both decide to assign the project to the candidate, then the 
project will be assigned to the candidate. In that case each of you pays 
the candidate £3.42 for his/her services. You do not know in advance 
whether the candidate will complete the project successfully or not, but 
each of you knows that chances of success are 45 in 100. If the project 
is completed successfully, you and the other decision-maker will each 
get £6.20. If the project is not completed successfully, you and the 
other decision-maker will each get £0.60. 
 If you and the other decision-maker make different decisions, no 
project assignment decision can be implemented and your 
disagreement will cost each of you £3.00 (to be deducted from 
each budget of £3.42).  
 
Do you as decision-maker assign the project to the candidate or not? 
Your answer: _______ 
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Question 5 
You are a GREEN decision-maker. You are randomly paired with a BLUE 
decision-maker. Each of you has a budget of £3.42. You and the other 
decision-maker face a randomly selected BLUE project candidate. Each of 
you has to decide independently whether to assign a project to this candidate 
or not. 
 If you both decide not to assign the project to the candidate, then the 
project will not be assigned to the candidate. In that case each of you 
simply keeps the £3.42 for him/herself. 
 If you both decide to assign the project to the candidate, then the 
project will be assigned to the candidate. In that case each of you pays 
the candidate £3.42 for his/her services. You do not know in advance 
whether the candidate will complete the project successfully or not, but 
each of you knows that chances of success are 35 in 100. If the project 
is completed successfully, you and the other decision-maker will each 
get £9.70. If the project is not completed successfully, you and the 
other decision-maker will each get £0.50. 
 If you and the other decision-maker make different decisions, no 
project assignment decision can be implemented and your 
disagreement will cost each of you £3.00 (to be deducted from 
each budget of £3.42).  
 
Do you as decision-maker assign the project to the candidate or not? 
Your answer: _______ 
 
 
Question 6 
You are a GREEN decision-maker. You are randomly paired with another 
GREEN decision-maker. Each of you has a budget of £3.42. You and the 
other decision-maker face a randomly selected GREEN project candidate. 
Each of you has to decide independently whether to assign a project to this 
candidate or not. 
 If you both decide not to assign the project to the candidate, then the 
project will not be assigned to the candidate. In that case each of you 
simply keeps the £3.42 for him/herself. 
 If you both decide to assign the project to the candidate, then the 
project will be assigned to the candidate. In that case each of you pays 
the candidate £3.42 for his/her services. You do not know in advance 
whether the candidate will complete the project successfully or not, but 
each of you knows that chances of success are 45 in 100. If the project 
is completed successfully, you and the other decision-maker will each 
get £6.20. If the project is not completed successfully, you and the 
other decision-maker will each get £0.60. 
 If you and the other decision-maker make different decisions, no 
project assignment decision can be implemented and your 
disagreement will cost each of you £3.00 (to be deducted from 
each budget of £3.42).  
 
Do you as decision-maker assign the project to the candidate or not? 
Your answer: _______ 
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[PROJECT CANDIDATE IDENTITY SESSIONS] 
 
You are a BLUE project candidate. This is your role for all remaining 
questions.  
 
In the boxes in small print you see the questions as given to decision-makers. 
In each answer slot provided, please answer whether you think the decision-
maker will assign the project to the project candidate or not. For each correct 
answer you will get £3. 
 
 
Question as seen by decision-maker 
 
You are a GREEN decision-maker. You have a budget of £3.42. You face a randomly 
selected BLUE project candidate. You have to decide whether to assign a project to this 
candidate or not.  
 If you decide not to assign the project to the candidate, then the project will not be 
assigned to the candidate. In that case you simply keep the £3.42 for yourself. 
 If you decide to assign the project to the candidate, then the project will be assigned 
to the candidate. In that case you pay the candidate £3.42 for his/her services. You 
do not know in advance whether the candidate will complete the project successfully 
or not, but you know that chances of success are 35 in 100. If the project is 
completed successfully, you will get £9.70. If the project is not completed 
successfully, you will get £0.50. 
 
Question 1: Do you think this decision-maker above will assign the project to 
the candidate or not? 
Your answer: _______ 
 
 
 
Question as seen by decision-maker 
 
You are a GREEN decision-maker. You have a budget of £3.42. You face a randomly 
selected GREEN project candidate. You have to decide whether to assign a project to this 
candidate or not.  
 If you decide not to assign the project to the candidate, then the project will not be 
assigned to the candidate. In that case you simply keep the £3.42 for yourself. 
 If you decide to assign the project to the candidate, then the project will be assigned 
to the candidate. In that case you pay the candidate £3.42 for his/her services. You 
do not know in advance whether the candidate will complete the project successfully 
or not, but you know that chances of success are 45 in 100. If the project is 
completed successfully, you will get £6.20. If the project is not completed 
successfully, you will get £0.60.  
 
 
Question 2: Do you think this decision-maker above will assign the project to 
the candidate or not? 
Your answer: _______ 
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Question as seen by decision-maker 
 
You are a GREEN decision-maker. You are randomly paired with a BLUE decision-maker. 
Each of you has a budget of £3.42. You and the other decision-maker face a randomly 
selected GREEN project candidate. Each of you has to decide independently whether to 
assign a project to this candidate or not. 
 If you both decide not to assign the project to the candidate, then the project will not 
be assigned to the candidate. In that case each of you simply keeps the £3.42 for 
him/herself. 
 If you both decide to assign the project to the candidate, then the project will be 
assigned to the candidate. In that case each of you pays the candidate £3.42 for 
his/her services. You do not know in advance whether the candidate will complete the 
project successfully or not, but each of you knows that chances of success are 45 in 
100. If the project is completed successfully, you and the other decision-maker will 
each get £6.20. If the project is not completed successfully, you and the other 
decision-maker will each get £0.60. 
 If you and the other decision-maker make different decisions, no project 
assignment decision can be implemented and your disagreement will cost each 
of you £3.00 (to be deducted from each budget of £3.42).  
 
Question 3: Do you think this decision-maker above will assign the project to 
the candidate or not? 
Your answer: _______ 
 
 
 
Question as seen by decision-maker 
 
You are a GREEN decision-maker. You are randomly paired with another GREEN decision-
maker. Each of you has a budget of £3.42. You and the other decision-maker face a randomly 
selected GREEN project candidate. Each of you has to decide independently whether to 
assign a project to this candidate or not. 
 If you both decide not to assign the project to the candidate, then the project will not 
be assigned to the candidate. In that case each of you simply keeps the £3.42 for 
him/herself. 
 If you both decide to assign the project to the candidate, then the project will be 
assigned to the candidate. In that case each of you pays the candidate £3.42 for 
his/her services. You do not know in advance whether the candidate will complete the 
project successfully or not, but each of you knows that chances of success are 45 in 
100. If the project is completed successfully, you and the other decision-maker will 
each get £6.20. If the project is not completed successfully, you and the other 
decision-maker will each get £0.60. 
 If you and the other decision-maker make different decisions, no project 
assignment decision can be implemented and your disagreement will cost each 
of you £3.00 (to be deducted from each budget of £3.42).  
 
Question 4: Do you think this decision-maker above will assign the project to 
the candidate or not? 
Your answer: _______ 
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Question as seen by decision-maker 
 
You are a GREEN decision-maker. You are randomly paired with a BLUE decision-maker. 
Each of you has a budget of £3.42. You and the other decision-maker face a randomly 
selected BLUE project candidate. Each of you has to decide independently whether to assign 
a project to this candidate or not. 
 If you both decide not to assign the project to the candidate, then the project will not 
be assigned to the candidate. In that case each of you simply keeps the £3.42 for 
him/herself. 
 If you both decide to assign the project to the candidate, then the project will be 
assigned to the candidate. In that case each of you pays the candidate £3.42 for 
his/her services. You do not know in advance whether the candidate will complete the 
project successfully or not, but each of you knows that chances of success are 35 in 
100. If the project is completed successfully, you and the other decision-maker will 
each get £9.70. If the project is not completed successfully, you and the other 
decision-maker will each get £0.50. 
 If you and the other decision-maker make different decisions, no project 
assignment decision can be implemented and your disagreement will cost each 
of you £3.00 (to be deducted from each budget of £3.42).  
 
Question 5: Do you think this decision-maker above will assign the project to 
the candidate or not? 
Your answer: _______ 
 
 
 
Question as seen by decision-maker 
 
You are a GREEN decision-maker. You are randomly paired with another GREEN decision-
maker. Each of you has a budget of £3.42. You and the other decision-maker face a randomly 
selected BLUE project candidate. Each of you has to decide independently whether to assign 
a project to this candidate or not. 
 If you both decide not to assign the project to the candidate, then the project will not 
be assigned to the candidate. In that case each of you simply keeps the £3.42 for 
him/herself. 
 If you both decide to assign the project to the candidate, then the project will be 
assigned to the candidate. In that case each of you pays the candidate £3.42 for 
his/her services. You do not know in advance whether the candidate will complete the 
project successfully or not, but each of you knows that chances of success are 35 in 
100. If the project is completed successfully, you and the other decision-maker will 
each get £9.70. If the project is not completed successfully, you and the other 
decision-maker will each get £0.50. 
 If you and the other decision-maker make different decisions, no project 
assignment decision can be implemented and your disagreement will cost each 
of you £3.00 (to be deducted from each budget of £3.42).  
 
Question 6: Do you think this decision-maker above will assign the project to 
the candidate or not? 
Your answer: _______ 
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